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 ORAL DISSENTING ON THE SUPREME COURT
Christopher W. Schmidt* and Carolyn Shapiro**
ABSTRACT
In this Article we offer the first comprehensive evaluation of oral dissenting on
the Supreme Court.  We examine the practice in both historical and contemporary per-
spective, take stock of the emerging academic literature on the subject, and suggest
a new framework for analysis of oral dissenting.  Specifically, we put forth several
claims.  Contrary to the common assumption of scholarship and media coverage, oral
dissents are nothing new.  Oral dissenting has a long tradition, and its history pro-
vides valuable lessons for understanding the potential and limits of oral dissents today. 
Furthermore, not all oral dissents are alike.  Dissenting Justices may have different
reasons for deciding to announce their opinions, and the reception and potential in-
fluence of an oral dissent varies according to the situation.  Recent scholarly efforts
to identify a set of factors for predicting the likelihood of an oral dissent thus may miss
the forest for the trees.  The more interesting question, we suggest, is not necessarily
why a Justice might decide to announce a dissent, but why certain oral dissents seem
to reverberate while others (perhaps most) are ignored and forgotten.  We therefore
seek to recenter the discussion of oral dissents, moving to an empirical and analytical
discussion of the role that oral dissents actually play in the dynamic relationship
between the Court and the American people.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court handed down its much-anticipated
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.1  A five-member majority
voted to strike down prohibitions on corporate spending in elections.  To demonstrate
his deep disagreement with the majority, Justice Stevens chose to supplement his long,
forcefully written dissent with a twenty-minute summary from the bench.  His perfor-
mance immediately became part of the story told in the media coverage of the deci-
sion.  Stevens, according to one account, spoke “in a slow, halting voice, periodically
getting tangled up in thickets of words like ‘corporation’ and ‘corruption.’”2  In con-
trast to Justice Kennedy’s “brisk” summary of the majority’s opinion, Justice Stevens
1 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2 Dahlia Lithwick, The Pinocchio Project: Watching as the Supreme Court Turns a
Corporation Into a Real Live Boy, SLATE, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2242208/;
see also Robert Barnes, High Court Shows It Might Be Willing to Act Boldly, WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A4 (“Thought by many to be ready to leave the bench after this term, Stevens
stumbled uncharacteristically in more than 20 minutes of denouncing the majority opinion.”);
Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at
A1 (describing Stevens talking “[i]n sometimes halting fashion”); Adam Liptak, Stevens Era,
Nearing End, Takes On An Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A12 [hereinafter Liptak,
Stevens Era] (“He seemed weary, and more than once he stumbled over and mispronounced
ordinary words in the lawyer’s lexicon—corruption, corporation, allegation. Sometimes he
would take a second or third run at the word, sometimes not.”).
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“labored through a 20-minute rebuttal,” which, in a portrait offered by the New York
Times, invoked “a sort of twilight . . . over the courtroom.  It seemed the Stevens era
was ending.”3
Citizens United is only one of the latest examples of notable oral dissents.  In the
2007, for example, Justice Ginsburg has used oral dissents when urging Congress to
override the majority opinion4 and when suggesting that the Court’s decision to up-
hold an abortion restriction virtually identical to one it struck down only a few years
earlier might be due to changes in the Court’s make-up.5  Even more recently, Justice
Ginsburg appeared to use her oral dissent in Ricci v. DeStefano,6 the New Haven fire-
fighters case, to address a national debate over whether “empathy” is, as President
Obama urged, a desirable trait for a Supreme Court Justice.7
Perhaps the most famous of recent oral dissents, however, is Justice Breyer’s 2007
bench statement in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1,8 the case in which the Supreme Court struck down Seattle and Louisville’s
3 Liptak, Stevens Era, supra note 2.
4 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). For a transcript and
recording of the opinion announcement, see http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/
2006_05_1074.
5 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). For a transcript and recording of the opinion
announcement, see http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_380. For a general
discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissents, see Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give
Ginsburg a New Voice, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A1[hereinafter Greenhouse, Ginsburg].
6 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
7 President Obama identified empathy as an important trait when selecting his first nominee
to the Supreme Court. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (May 1, 2009) (Statement
by President Barack Obama) (“I view the quality of empathy, or understanding and identify-
ing with people’s hopes and struggles, as an essential ingredient for arriving as [sic] just deci-
sions and outcomes.”). Obama’s critics argued that judicial empathy was a euphemism for
liberal judicial activism. See, e.g., Wendy E. Long, Opening of a Sorry Chapter, WASH. TIMES,
May 4, 2009 at A21 (deriding “empathy” as a “lawless standard of partiality”); This Week
(ABC television broadcast May 3, 2009) (statement of Senator Hatch), available at http://
www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/03/senators_leahy_and_hatch_on_this_week
_96318.html (“[H]e’s also said that a judge has to be a person of empathy. What does that
mean? Usually that’s a code word for an activist judge.”).
In Ricci, the Court found discriminatory New Haven’s decision to throw out the results
of a firefighter promotions test out of concern for its possible liability to African-American
firefighters under disparate impact law. Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent, read from a prepared
text that she distributed to the press, included a statement that the white firefighters who had
scored high on the test “understandably attract the court’s empathy.” Robert Barnes, Parsing
the Words of the Justices, WASH. POST, July 2, 2009, at A17. The use of the word “empathy”
was a deviation from the written opinion, which used the word “sympathy” instead. Ricci, 129
S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As one reporter put it, Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent
“seemed to be accusing her conservative colleagues in the majority of using the same stan-
dard that others have criticized President Obama for seeking in appointing judges: empathy.”
Barnes, supra.
8 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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voluntary efforts to desegregate their schools.  In fact, one of the most widely quoted
lines from the dissent, if not from the entire case, appears nowhere in the more than
seventy-seven pages of his written dissent.  Speaking from the bench, and condemning
the majority opinion for abandoning the principles and promise of Brown v. Board of
Education,9 Justice Breyer stated: “It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly
changed so much.”10  This statement, described by one observer as a “direct slap”
at Breyer’s new colleagues, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,11 became a key
element of public discussions about the case.12
These and other recent high-profile oral dissents have received prominent media
coverage in recent years,13 and they have been the focus of a number of scholarly
articles.  Yet there has not yet been a comprehensive evaluation of the practice of dis-
senting from the bench.  This Article fills that void.  It evaluates the significance of
Supreme Court oral dissents as both historical and contemporary practice, takes stock
of the emerging but limited academic literature on the subject, and offers a new frame-
work for analysis of oral dissenting going forward.
As a result of this research, we make several claims.  First, contrary to the assump-
tion of much contemporary commentary and media coverage, oral dissents are nothing
new.  The practice of Justices using the bench on decision day as a platform to draw
attention to their views, to dramatize disagreements and tensions within the Court, and
to attempt to engage the public has a rich historical pedigree.  Although it is too soon
to tell whether the recent high profile instances are a harbinger of a growing embrace
of oral dissents by the current Justices, such a development would be more a return
to past practice than a novel departure for the Court.
Second, we emphasize that not all bench dissents are alike.  Although recent
empirical scholarship has tended to approach oral dissents as a unitary category,14 the
differences between oral dissents may be as interesting as what they have in common. 
Any given oral dissent might serve one or more distinct purposes.  It might be de-
signed as a general public plea to constitutional principles.  It might be intended as a
more directed plea—a call to Congress, for example, to override a majority holding. 
Or it might simply reflect interpersonal tensions within the Court.
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10 Transcript of Opinion Announcement, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (hereinafter Oral Opinion of Justice Breyer), available at http://www
.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion.
11 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 336
(2007).
12 See infra Part III.
13 See, e.g., Greenhouse, Ginsburg, supra note 5; Adam Liptak, When Words on Paper
Don’t Convey Enough Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, at A12.
14 See, e.g., Jill Duffy & Elizabeth Lambert, Dissents from the Bench: A Compilation of
Oral Dissents by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 102 L. LIBR. J. 7 (2010); Timothy R. Johnson
et al., Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench?,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1560 (2009).
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Third, as important as the oral dissent itself is the way in which the press and
commentators discuss it in their reporting and criticism of the Court’s work.  While
recent scholarly attention on oral dissents has focused on the Justices—on why they
chose to dissent15 and on how they might use oral dissents to engage with the public
on the major legal issues of the day16—our research demonstrates that extrajudicial
actors largely control, even create, the significance of oral dissents.17  Many oral dis-
sents are not even mentioned in the mainstream press or are mentioned only in passing
with no meaningful discussion of their content.
Oral dissents thus become prominent parts of public discussion or debate only
when the press or other extrajudicial actors find in the dissent a storyline that helps
dramatize an otherwise attractive narrative.  The traction of an oral dissent in public
discourse is largely a product of factors well beyond the control of the dissenting
Justice.  We explore the implications of this reality, and we suggest that the Justices’
contemporary use of oral dissents demonstrates some ambivalence about their relation-
ship with the press and, ultimately, with the public.
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I examines the recent attention Supreme
Court oral dissents have received among legal scholars.  This scholarship has tended in
one of two directions: either a narrow focus on the factors that make oral dissents more
likely or a broad, prescriptive discussion of oral dissents as catalysts for social re-
form movements.  The more useful level of analysis, we argue, lies between these two
approaches: a middle ground examination of the mechanisms by which oral dissents
are interpreted and promulgated, with particular attention to the role of the press.
We develop our case for this approach to oral dissenting in the next two parts. 
Part II describes the historical development and use of oral dissents.  Oral dissents, are
hardly new.  In this Part, we also begin to demonstrate the wide range of types of
oral dissents and the surprisingly unpredictable nature of the press coverage of these
events.  In Part III, we turn to the modern era of oral dissenting.  Here, we extend the
themes identified in Part II to argue that oral dissents continue to be both diverse in
apparent motivation and underreported in the press.  We conclude the Article by not-
ing that oral dissents can indeed play a role in public dialogue about important issues
and we discuss steps the Justices might take if they wish to maximize their influence
over such discussion.
15 See infra Part I.A.
16 See infra Part I.B.
17 One recent example of the media helping to create the significance of oral dissents is
found in Linda Greenhouse’s claim that the 2006 Term would be “remembered as the time
when Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg found her voice, and used it.” Greenhouse, Ginsburg,
supra note 5. Yet Ginsburg had already orally dissented six other times before that Term—
more times than most of her colleagues during the same period of time. Greenhouse’s focus on
these particular recent oral dissents, however, helped to create a narrative about both Justice
Ginsburg and the 2006 Term.
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I. RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON ORAL DISSENTING: 
MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES
The high-profile oral dissents in 2007—and the widespread attention they
received18—sparked a number of scholarly articles.  These works generally fall into
one of two categories.  First, there are articles that use statistical techniques to attempt
to identify the circumstances under which Justices are most likely to dissent from the
bench.19  Second, there are articles that describe and assess the actual and potential
social and political impact of these dissents.20  Most notable among these are Lani
Guinier’s 2008 Harvard Law Review Foreword,21 her subsequent extension and dis-
cussion of the Foreword in a Boston University Law Review article,22 and a number
of pieces responding to her work.23
This Part explores this recent wave of scholarship on oral dissents.  We evaluate
the central claims they put forth and identify areas of weaknesses, including conflict-
ing conclusions, underexamined assumptions, and issues that remain to be addressed.
A. The Empirical Approach
Two articles by teams of political scientists attempt to identify those factors that
increase the likelihood that a Justice will issue an oral dissent: Hear Me Roar: What
Provokes Supreme Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench, by Timothy R. Johnson,
18 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg’s Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH.
POST, May 30, 2007, at A1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race
in Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Integration
Plans]; Greenhouse, Ginsburg, supra note 5. In addition to the mainstream press, these oral
dissents received attention from legal commentators. See, e.g., Jeff Bleich et al., Dissenting
from the Bench, S.F. ATT’Y MAG., Spring 2008, at 30, 31–32; John Q. Barrett, Commending
Opinion Announcements by Supreme Court Justices 4 (2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.stjohns.edu/media/3/55c14b0772794f148fec48e3c14851a7.pdf.
19 Johnson et al., supra note 14; William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, “The Brooding
Spirit of the Law”: Supreme Court Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. SYS.
J. 1 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328496; see also Duffy & Lambert, supra
note 14, at 23–37 (attempting to identify every case from 1969 to the present for which the
authors could confirm there was an oral dissent).
20 Johnson et al. make brief motions toward exploring the possible effects of oral dissents,
supra note 14, at 1580–81, but this is not the focus of their article.
21 Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008)
[hereinafter Guinier, Foreword].
22 Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89
B.U. L. REV. 539 (2009) [hereinafter Guinier, Courting the People].
23 Professor Guinier’s Boston University Law Review article was the centerpiece of a panel
discussion on “Beyond Legislatures: Social Movements, Social Change, and the Possibilities
of Demosprudence” held at Boston University Law School in November 2008. The Boston
University Law Review published reaction pieces to Guinier’s article by Gerald Rosenberg,
Robert Post, Linda McClain, and Fredrick Harris in 89 B.U. L. REV. 563–608 (2009).
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Ryan C. Black, and Eve M. Ringsmuth (HMR), and The Brooding Spirit of the Law:
Supreme Court Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench, by William Blake and Hans
Hacker.  These works both use logistic regression to compare cases in which there
were known oral dissents with other cases that included dissenting opinions.  Both
teams of scholars use concededly incomplete data sets.  Their works are among the
very first to study the phenomenon of oral dissents and as a result they worked with
the data available to them at the time.24  Their findings and conclusions must therefore
be considered preliminary.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two studies agree that oral dis-
sents are more likely in closely decided cases.25  Indeed, Blake and Hacker found that
the size of the majority coalition had the most explanatory power of any variable that
they tested.26  Each study also attempted to identify the political salience of particular
cases and concluded that at least some measures of salience make oral dissents more
likely.  Blake and Hacker found, for example, that oral dissents were more likely in
cases involving federalism and privacy (mostly abortion), although they found no
such effect for cases involving civil rights or criminal law and procedure.27  The HMR
24 HMR used every case for which an opinion announcement audio file was available on
the Oyez website as of August 2007. They identified 40 orally announced opinions. Johnson
et al., supra note 14, at 1573. In discussing the HMR findings, we will refer to all of these
orally delivered opinions as dissents, although six of them were concurrences. Id. at 1573–74
n.75. Since these authors gathered their data, many more opinion announcement recordings
have been uploaded onto Oyez.com. See Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 13.
Blake and Hacker built a more comprehensive database of dissents. They supplemented
the Oyez material with a survey of press accounts and they identified a total of ninety-three oral
dissenting opinions in eighty-six separate cases, beginning with the Burger Court in 1970. Blake
& Hacker, supra note 19, at 5; E-mail from William Blake to Carolyn Shapiro (March 27,
2009) (on file with author). They do not include concurring opinions in their count. Blake &
Hacker, supra note 19, at 5. The significant difference in the size of the two studies’ data sets
certainly may explain some of their inconsistent findings. Despite Blake and Hacker’s consid-
erably larger data set, however, their findings, too, must be considered preliminary. As we will
show, press reports of oral dissents are surprisingly inconsistent and oral dissents are often under-
reported. Since they relied heavily on press reports in building their data set, their study is better
understood as evaluating the likelihood of an oral dissent being issued and of it being reported.
25 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 18 (finding that the smaller the size of the majority
coalition, the more likely a Justice was to read a dissent from the bench); Johnson et al., supra
note 14, at 1578–79 (finding that cases decided by a minimum winning coalition—generally
5-4 decisions—were more likely than other cases to have oral dissents). There are instances,
however, of a lone dissenter reading from the bench in an 8-1 case. Justice Scalia did so, for
example, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Scalia In Dissent,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1988, at A1.
26 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 18.
27 Id. at 19–20. To identify issue areas, Blake and Hacker relied on the widely-used
Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu. Despite the database’s ubiquity in the political
science and empirical legal studies literature, its coding of issue areas is problematic and
incomplete. See generally Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the
Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (2009).
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authors found that the more questions a Justice asked at oral argument, the more likely
that Justice was to announce a dissent orally.28
The studies also present some surprisingly inconsistent findings.  Most notably, the
studies disagree as to whether a greater ideological distance between majority opinion
writer and dissenter makes an oral dissent more or less likely.  Blake and Hacker found
that oral dissents are more likely the closer the two Justices are ideologically,29 while
HMR reached the opposite conclusion.30  Blake and Hacker also found that oral dis-
sents were more likely where a case “formally alters precedent,”31 or when the Court
decides constitutional issues.32  The HMR authors, in contrast, found that formal alter-
ation of precedent or a declaration that a law was unconstitutional had no statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of a Justice dissenting orally.33
The HMR authors make little attempt to explain their statistical results, perhaps due
to their preliminary nature.  In contrast, Blake and Hacker offer an intriguing hypoth-
esis for why Justices choose to dissent from the bench.  They argue that:
[The decision to dissent at all] is a component of the collabora-
tion and bargaining characterized by opinion writing and voting
fluidity. However, it remains predominantly a behavioral option
to which justices resort when those processes are strained. . . . 
The subject of our study here raises the prospect of a more severe
response on the part of the justices—dissenting from the bench
28 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 1577–78.
29 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 20–21.
30 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 1576–77. Not only did the two studies use different
datasets, but they also measured ideological distance differently. The HMR authors relied
on Judicial Common Space scores popular among political scientists. Id. at 1574 (citing Lee
Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306–07 (2007)).
Blake and Hacker, on the other hand, used the percentage of liberal votes cast by each Justice,
as coded in the Supreme Court Database, supra note 27. They then calculated ideological dis-
tance as the absolute value of the difference in those scores between the majority author and
the dissenter. Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 14. For a critique of the database’s liberal/
conservative ideology coding, see Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics,
and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79 (2010).
31 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 18.
32 Id. at 18. Blake and Hacker hypothesize that this is because “correction cannot be had
through legislative means.” Id. They overstate this claim, however. They describe cases of judi-
cial review as deciding the constitutionality of a “legislative enactment.” Of course judicial
review can also be of executive or judicial actions. Moreover, correction of a sort can be had
through legislation when an enactment is upheld as constitutional. Under those circumstances,
the legislature can still decide to repeal the law. Nor do Blake and Hacker provide any theo-
retical reason why lack of a legislative remedy should make oral dissenting more likely. To the
contrary, if the dissenting Justices are appealing to the public, one might expect oral dissents
to be most common where Congress is able to act.
33 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 1574.
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may indicate that bargaining and accommodation have broken
down irreparably.34
This hypothesis is consistent with a number of their findings.  In particular, it is con-
sistent with their and HMR’s finding that the smaller the majority coalition, the more
likely there will be an oral dissent.  “[B]argaining and accommodation among justices
within the majority coalition occurs most frequently when that coalition is of minimum
winning size,” they suggest.35  The excluded dissenter in a close case may therefore
feel more frustration—perhaps seeing moments when the bargaining and accommo-
dation on the winning side might not have succeeded—than in an “8-1 case in which
a dissenting Justice may be resigned to a lonely fate.”36
Blake and Hacker’s hypothesis also provides a possible explanation for their
counterintuitive finding that greater ideological distance between majority author
and dissenter reduces the likelihood of an oral dissent.  They suggest that bargaining
and accommodation are more likely to have been attempted but to have failed where
the Justices are ideologically close than where they are further apart, leading to the
ideologically close, but frustrated Justice orally dissenting.37
Intriguing as their findings and hypotheses may be, however, the empirical studies
leave unaddressed some fundamental questions.  Essentially, these studies and their
statistical techniques attempt to determine what oral dissents have in common in com-
parison to dissents that were not orally delivered.  But this approach may be of limited
value for two important reasons.  First, the factors that make oral dissent more likely
do not make them likely in an absolute sense.  Even in the presence of all of the statis-
tically significant factors, oral dissents remain somewhat infrequent, and the empirical
analysis therefore may not give us much insight into why particular Justices dissent
in particular cases.38  Such insight might be better gained through the more qualitative,
thick descriptive approach that we pursue in later parts of this Article.
Second, the statistical approach is not conducive to an analysis of the ways in
which oral dissents differ from each other.  A recognition of the diverse qualities of
oral dissents allows us to understand not only the reasons that particular Justices might
be motivated to dissent from the bench in particular cases, but also changing norms
over time, differing views of the appropriateness of oral dissents in general, personality
34 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 2.
35 Id. at 10.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 21.
38 This problem is a recurrent one in empirical legal scholarship, where the fact that a vari-
able has a tiny impact on a particular outcome may be ignored while the fact that it is statis-
tically significant is used to suggest that the variable is substantively important. See BRIAN
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING
145 (2010) (citing STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIDRE MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE (2008)) (arguing that statistical studies of judging overemphasize “whether”
a factor has an effect to the expense of considering “how much” of an effect it has).
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quirks, and interpersonal dynamics.  Our exploration of the history of oral dissents
attempts to flesh out these and other differing features of oral dissents.
B. The Qualitative Approach
In contrast to the empirical studies’ focus on the conditions under which a Justice
is more likely to deliver an oral dissent, recent work by Professor Lani Guinier explores
the social and political meaning and potential of oral dissents.  In her Harvard Law
Review Foreword following the close of the Supreme Court’s 2007 Term,39 Guinier
describes what she calls the “demosprudential” potential of oral dissents.  “Demospru-
dence” is a term she and Professor Gerald Torres have coined to describe jurispru-
dence that bolsters democratic participation and accountability.40  An oral dissent can
be demosprudential, she argues, because it “offer[s] a novel and potentially interactive
pedagogical space, one that, with the right technology and a democratizing agenda,
could spark a lively conversation among, and with, a decidedly non-professional and
non-elite audience.”41  That conversation would be “democracy-enhancing” because
it can “inform and [be] informed by the wisdom of the people” and “engage a wider
constituency in debates about the core conflicts at the heart of democracy.”42
Guinier’s primary example of the demosprudential potential of oral dissents is
Justice Breyer’s bench statement in Parents Involved.43  Justice Breyer’s oral dissent
was notable for its length, its passionate delivery, and—especially—for its blunt (and
unwritten) assessment of the case’s significance: “It is not often in law that so few
have so quickly changed so much.”44  Guinier describes Breyer’s twenty-one minute
39 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21.
40 Id. at 15 n.46 (citing LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, CHANGING THE WIND: THE
DEMOSPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (forthcoming 2010)).
41 Id. at 12.
42 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 15–16. Although Guinier acknowledges that written
dissents and concurrences (and even, on occasion, majority opinions like Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) can serve these purposes, she argues that oral dissents are par-
ticularly suited to demosprudence. Id. at 52. Oral dissents, she explains, “offer an intriguing
prism on the way that dissents provide alternative sources of democratic legitimacy and impor-
tant pathways toward democratic accountability. Oral dissents tend to be short. They are con-
versational in style. They have no footnotes. . . . [T]hey are often impassioned.” Id. at 23
(citations omitted). Bench announcements allow a Justice to abandon the formal conventions
of judicial opinions, “tell a good ‘public story’” and thereby to “speak to members of the public
at large rather than to the dissenter’s usually sequestered colleagues.” Id. at 49–50.
43 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Parents
Involved is not the only example she cites, however. She notes Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissents
in both Ledbetter and Carhart, as well as both oral and written dissents—and one written
concurrence—from the Court’s October 2007 Term. Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at
42–43; see also id. at 4 (citing Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (oral dissent); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (oral dissent); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
44 Oral Opinion of Justice Breyer, supra note 10, at 32:53–33:01.
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dramatic delivery in “a voice both incredulous and distressed,”45 and his use of “memo-
ries, values, and practices that might . . . resonate[ ] with a less educated audience,
including those who never graduated from high school but had seen evidence in their
own lives of what he described.”46  Moreover, Breyer’s arguments were also explicitly
concerned with democratic institutions.  “[D]emocratically elected school boards,”
he argued, should have “‘significant practical leeway’ . . . to make educational policy
that ‘tries to bring people together.’”47  Although the audio was not made public until
months later, and although Justice Breyer never released a transcript or written version
of his bench announcement, his oral dissent “reverberated throughout the blogosphere,
inviting other non-judicial dissenters to speak up in more traditional media.”48
For Guinier, the Parents Involved oral dissent met the key criteria of a demospru-
dential dissent.  In attacking the majority for overruling plans that were “adopted
democratically to overcome racial isolation . . . [and that] are ‘partly remedial, partly
educational, partly civic,’”49 Breyer’s statement “engage[d] with a core issue of
democratic legitimacy, democratic accountability, democratic structure, or democratic
viability.”50  The oral dissent had a “dramatic tone” that was less a “conventional point-
by-point refutation of the majority’s logical flaws” than a discussion “organized around
values.”51  And, perhaps most critically, she argues that the oral dissent spoke “to non-
judicial actors, whether legislators, local thought leaders, or ordinary people, and en-
courage[d] them to step in or step up to revisit the majority’s conclusions.”52
Not only was Breyer’s announcement more accessible to this audience than a
typical written opinion, but, Guinier claims, “some ordinary people were listening.”53 
The dissent “had legs in directly affected communities.”54  One of the non-judicial
actors Guinier highlights was Pat Todd, an education administrator in Louisville who
“used the dissent to remind herself, her colleagues, and Louisville residents that they
controlled some chess pieces too.”55  Similarly, local officials and community leaders
were “[a]ffirmed in part by Justice Breyer’s dissent” in their efforts to “explore the
options” still available to them to ensure racially integrated schools.56  “Emboldened
45 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 8.
46 Id. at 10.
47 Id. at 8 (quoting Oral Opinion of Justice Breyer, supra note 10, at 25:16–25:27).
48 Id. at 10 & n.23 (citing Jack Greenberg’s denunciation of the ruling as “the rebirth of
massive resistance in more acceptable form”).
49 Id. at 8 (quoting Oral Opinion of Justice Breyer, supra note 10, at 21:05–21:09).
50 Id. at 49.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 12.
54 Id.; see also id. at 37 (noting that Breyer’s oral dissent “seems to have had some practical
impact” on local school boards).
55 Id. at 12.
56 Id. at 12–13. Guinier speculates that Breyer might have had personal reasons for de-
livering his oral dissent as he did. He may have sought to “link[ ] himself to the civil rights
community, and especially civil rights attorneys. Perhaps he issued an impassioned oral
86 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:75
by the dissent,” Guinier explains, “Todd and her cohorts are ‘norm entrepreneurs’
who are pushing back on the majority’s formulation because it is inconsistent with the
values of the community they represent.”57
Like the empirical scholars, Guinier raises important questions that are worthy of
additional inquiry, yet her analysis of oral dissenting tends to waver between descrip-
tive claims that demand additional empirical support and aspirational claims that too
often strain plausibility.  Her claim, for example, that Breyer’s oral dissent in Parents
Involved had a discernible impact on the reactions of Todd and others is unsupported,
as pointed out by Professor Gerald Rosenberg.58  In Guinier’s telling, causation tends
to be assumed rather than demonstrated.  The nature of the causal links she alludes to
are somewhat fuzzy: oral dissents “affirm[]”59 or “embolden[]”;60 they “reverberate[]”
and they “invite[ ].”61
In response to such critiques, Guinier retreats somewhat, asserting that “Rosenberg
wrongly assumes that my claims are descriptive rather than aspirational.”62  Guinier
does in fact make some descriptive claims about the influence of oral dissents on social
movements.  But she apparently intends these claims to be understood as suggesting
ways in which oral dissents might interact with social movements rather than as actually
demonstrating that they have already done so.  In other words, Guinier’s descriptions
of the impact of the oral dissents in Parents Involved and other cases might be primarily
a rhetorical device.  Indeed, much of Guinier’s rhetoric is explicitly aspirational:63 oral
dissent—to which the civil rights lawyers bore witness—to show that ‘he gets it,’ that he is
not just a technocrat with a steady but relatively quiet record on civil rights.” Id. at 36. He
also might have been consciously reaching out to local school board officials, a possibility
Guinier attributes to Breyer’s background as an administrative law scholar and his father’s
career as a lawyer for a school board. Id. at 37–38.
57 Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
58 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 570–71 (2009) (noting
the lack of evidence that Todd knew about the oral dissent, as opposed to the written version).
59 Id. at 12.
60 Id. at 13.
61 Id. at 10; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
62 Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 22, at 548. Robert Post defends Guinier against
Gerald Rosenberg’s criticism that she fails to convincingly demonstrate that dissents have had
any real impact on social movements by questioning the utility of causality to the issue. “[W]hat
matters,” according to Post, “is the texture and substance of dialogue,” and judicial statements
play a role in shaping the political dialogue over basic constitutional principles even if this
effect cannot be demonstrated in an empirical causal analysis. Robert Post, Law Professors and
Political Scientists: Observations on the Law/Politics Distinction in the Guinier/Rosenberg
Debate, 89 B.U. L. REV. 581, 585 (2009). “Arguments about cause and effect can surely be
relevant to assessing the plausibility of the descriptions we offer, but these descriptions must
be understood in the first instance as qualitative rather than causal.” Id. at 586. Post does
admit, however, that Guinier’s arguments as applied specifically to oral dissents are “perhaps
vulnerable to some of the empirical points that Rosenberg advances.” Id. at 583.
63 In her Boston Law Review article, Guinier explicitly draws upon hypotheticals to make
her point about the potential of oral dissents. Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21.
2010] ORAL DISSENTING ON THE SUPREME COURT 87
dissents “have a distinctive potential;” they “may spark a deliberative process;” they
“can become a crucial tool.”64
Guinier also identifies a central obstacle to opinion announcements having a real
influence on society: dissemination.  To allow oral dissents to reach their potential as
significant contributions to a democratic discussion of constitutional principles, they
need to be more directly conveyed to a broader audience.  Currently, the dissemination
of an oral dissent is largely dependent on an intermediary—the press sitting in the
courtroom on decision day.  Audio recordings of bench opinions are not released until
months after the fact.65  Guinier points out that technology allows the wide and imme-
diate dissemination of oral dissents.66  “For purposes of reaching a larger audience (for
whom the Justices are otherwise invisible and indistinct from one another), the orality
of delivering a dissent from the bench, which is then available on audiotape to the
larger public, seems to be a potentially revolutionary communication ‘technology.’”67 
Such technology, Guinier argues, could help bring the demosprudential potential of
oral dissents to fulfillment.
Moreover, Guinier does not claim that the mere existence of oral dissents, even
with wider and more effective dissemination, would be sufficient to spark democratic
engagement by a critical mass of people.  Rather, “social activists, legal advocacy
groups, media translators, legislators and ‘role-literate participants’”—people like Pat
Todd—would need to hear and act upon the Justices’ messages.68  And to some degree,
the Justices do reach such individuals already.  One example of this kind of dialogue
between a dissenting Justice and social movement leaders is Justice Ginsburg’s dis-
sent in Ledbetter, in which she urged congressional action to correct the majority’s
interpretation of Title VII.  Marcia Greenberger of the National Women’s Law Center
heard and responded to what she described as Justice Ginsburg’s “clarion call,” and
worked to get Congress to override the decision.69
64 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
65 See Oyez FAQ, http://www.oyez.org/faq/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
66 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 54 (arguing that “[a]s a result of the Court’s
resistance to twenty-first-century technology, most oral dissents do not yet realize their
demosprudential potential”).
67 Id. at 28.
68 Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 22, at 543 (citing Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case
of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1339–48 (2006)). Guinier concedes, however,
that no “single Justice in dissent could issue a poetic and inspired commentary that by itself
could initiate action and be historically relevant in the same way as Martin Luther King’s
speech at Holt Street Baptist Church in Montgomery in 1955 or on the Washington Mall in
1963.” Id. at 561.
69 Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 22, at 543–44. Another example of this
phenomenon is Ginsburg’s oral dissents in Gonzales v. Carhart. These cases clearly resonate
with Ginsburg’s historic role as a legal advocate for women’s rights. And Justice Scalia,
Guinier says, “effectively uses his originalist jurisprudence as ‘a language that a political
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Professor Guinier’s articles provide valuable insight into the practice and poten-
tial of oral dissents.  Yet we diverge from her conclusions and analysis at several
key points.  First, Guinier, like most contemporary commentators, assumes that
recent high-profile oral dissents represent “a new genre of judicial speech.”70  The
long and rich history of oral dissenting that we describe in the following Part belies
that assumption.
Second, we believe that an assessment of the democracy or dialogue-enhancing
potential of oral dissents requires an analysis of the process by which oral dissents
have long been communicated beyond the courtroom—if they are communicated at
all.  The history of this dissemination cautions against bold claims for the potential of
oral dissenting to make consistent contributions to popular discourse or social move-
ment mobilization.  Notably, the history of oral dissents highlights the critical role of
the media in creating (or ignoring) the public significance of an oral dissent.  Indeed,
we argue that dissents sometimes gain attention not because of their socially trans-
formative content, but because they are consistent with a narrative that the media is
eager to tell.
Guinier is surely right that releasing same-day audio of opinion hand downs on
the internet would greatly expand the audience for those announcements and would
provide social movements and their leaders more opportunities to capitalize on them. 
Should cameras ever appear in the U.S. Supreme Court, that change would also likely
expand the Court’s ability to engage in more of a dialogue with the public and with
other democratic institutions.  The effects of such changes, however, are likely to be
considerable more chaotic and unpredictable than Guinier suggests.71
II. HISTORICAL PRACTICES: ORAL DISSENTS THROUGH THE WARREN COURT
A look at the history of the public announcement of Supreme Court opinions
offers valuable perspective on the bench dissents of recent years.  The historical record
undermines certain assumptions contained in most recent media coverage and schol-
arly commentary on oral dissents.  Most obviously, history refutes the suggestion that
oral dissenting has always been a rare phenomenon.72  To the contrary, oral statements
in dissent, as well as in support of the majority holding, were common practice for
most of the Court’s history.  If we indeed stand on the cusp of an era in which Justices
articulate their dissenting positions from the bench more frequently and in terms more
movement can both understand and rally around.’” Id. at 546 (quoting Guinier, Foreword,
supra note 21, at 114).
70 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 10.
71 Cf. Dahlia Lithwick, The Internet and the Judiciary: We Are All Experts Now, in BENCH
PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007)
183–84 (arguing that while the Internet “provides the public with the tools to better under-
stand the law, [it] offers every incentive to deliberately misunderstand it—to distort and demean
and politicize it in ways that may have irreparable consequences”).
72 See, e.g., Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 2; Bleich et al., supra note 18, at 31.
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conversational and direct than in their written opinions, then this is hardly something
new.  Rather, it is best understood as a return to a relatively established past practice.
The historical record also establishes that many oral dissents fail to garner the atten-
tion of the press or the public.  This conclusion is in some tension with assumptions
made by contemporary commentators who suggest that an oral dissent is an inher-
ently newsworthy event.73  Finally, we conclude that to the extent that oral dissents
do become well-known, it is often because of factors unrelated to the underlying legal
arguments.  Identifying the reasons that a particular oral dissent becomes noteworthy
is confounded by not only the variety in motivation, style and frequency of such dis-
sents, but also by the necessary but unpredictable role of extrajudicial actors—most
notably the press—in interpreting and disseminating what happened in the courtroom. 
As a result, the significance of an oral dissent depends largely on circumstances be-
yond the Justices’ control.  And of course, not all oral dissents are the same, even on
the same Court, during the same Term, or issued by the same Justice.  Different oral
dissents appear to have different motivations and purposes.
A. A Brief History of Oral Announcements and Separate Opinions
To understand the place of oral dissents in the work of the Supreme Court, it is
necessary to situate them within the larger history of the Court’s opinion announce-
ments and dissenting practices.  Dissents must be understood in historical context. 
Since the Supreme Court issued its first decision in 1792, Court decisions have almost
always been orally announced.74  In fact, during its earliest years, the only opinions the
Court issued were oral ones, which the court reporter would transcribe and eventually
publish.75  Even after the Court began to submit written opinions to the Court Reporter
in 1834,76 the Justices continued to announce their opinions, sometimes through verba-
tim readings of the written opinion, sometimes through a prepared summary, and some-
times through an extemporaneous description.  Although there have been occasional
efforts within the Court to eliminate this practice of reading or announcing opinions,77
73 See, e.g., Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 14; Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 1564.
74 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 63 (1996).
75 Roy M. Mersky, Publishing, Law, in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 680
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002).
76 Id. According to Justice Story, the job of the Court Reporter was “to abridge arguments,
to state facts, [and] to give the opinions of the Court substantially as they [were] delivered.”
G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815–1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1,
33 (1984) (quoting Letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters (May 7, 1836)). Professor
White also notes that the process of actually publishing a decision during this period often
took months, and occasionally years. Id.
77 See, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939–1975, at 39–40 (1980)
(explaining Douglas’s claim to have proposed, at some point early in his tenure on the Court,
that the Justices give up the practice of reading or summarizing opinions from the bench);
Barrett, supra note 18, at 2–3 (describing Vinson’s initial discomfort with announcing opinions);
see also infra note 211 (describing Blackmun and Burger’s efforts to end the practice).
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the tradition remains.  Each Justice has the option to read his or her opinion, summarize
it, or, for a majority opinion, simply announce the result and note that an opinion has
been filed.78
Although oral opinion announcements have long been the norm, during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, concurrences and dissents were much rarer than
they are today, leading to fewer oral dissents.79  Chief Justice John Marshall steered the
Court away from its early practice of seriatim opinions and toward a new norm under
which Justices held back possible dissents and joined majority opinions that were then
presented to the public as the unified voice of the Court.80  Even into the early twen-
tieth century, some Justices remained uncomfortable about dissenting opinions.  “I
don’t approve of dissents generally,” explained Chief Justice William Howard Taft,
“for I think that in many cases where I differ from the majority, it is more important to
stand by the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record my individual
dissent where it is better to have the law certain than to have it settled either way.”81
Beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century and continuing over the course
of the twentieth century, this view gradually gave way to a greater appreciation of the
value of dissenting.  A dissent might serve, in the famous words of Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, as “an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelli-
gence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which
78 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
311–12 (8th ed. 2009). The current norm is that the majority opinion author reads a summary
of the opinion and then announces what separate opinions, if any, have been filed. Usually,
the authors of those separate opinions do not speak.
79 David M. O’Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering
the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTION-
ALIST APPROACHES 92 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
80 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919). Marshall’s biographer
described his insistence on having the Court present a unified front as “one of those acts of
audacity that later marked the assumption of power which rendered his career historic.” Id.;
see also White, supra note 76, at 34–47. The institutional benefits of unanimity did not escape
the Justices even long after separate opinions became commonplace. Chief Justice Warren
famously worked hard for a unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education precisely
because he believed unanimity would give the unquestionably controversial outcome more
authority. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of Law and the Achievement of Unanimity
in Brown, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 748–49 (2004–2005).
81 Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1311 (2001)
(quoting Chief Justice Taft). Chief Justice Stone expressed similar reservations. ALPHEUS
THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 303 (1956) (“Somehow, dis-
senting opinions always seem to me a dismal business. When I do it I feel somewhat as the
smart youth ought to feel when he proclaims his opinion, which has not proved convincing
to older and wiser men. This feeling has kept me silent sometimes when I had the inclination
to speak, but I soon found that when I remained silent, despite strongly held convictions the
other way, I was not altogether happy with myself.” (quoting Letter from Justice Stone to Judge
Proskauer (March 21, 1930))).
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the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”82  Beginning in the
1940s, the percentage of non-unanimous decisions increased dramatically and dissents
became far less exceptional.83  Recent and current Justices are unafraid to issue written
dissents, providing them with plenty of opportunities to deliver oral dissents.84
B. The Occasional Drama of Decision Days
Opinion announcements can be rather tedious affairs, even for significant cases. 
During Justice Tom Clark’s long announcement of the majority opinion in Abington
School District v. Schempp (1963),85 a landmark case that held unconstitutional re-
quired reading of the Bible in schools, a restless Justice William O. Douglas passed
a note to Justice Hugo Black.  “Is he going to read all of it?” Douglas asked. “He
told me he was only going to say a few words—he is on p. 20 now—58 more to go. 
Perhaps we need an antifilibuster rule as badly as some say the Senate does.”86
But there are notable exceptions when decision day is anything but routine.  The
drama of a decision’s announcement can derive simply from the significance of the
ruling, perhaps heightened by particular aspects of the oral presentation.  One such
dramatic announcement came on May 17, 1954, when Chief Justice Earl Warren read
the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.87  Warren recalled the scene
in his memoirs: “As we Justices marched into the courtroom on that day, there was
a tenseness that I have not seen equaled before or since.”88  Justice Jackson, who had
been away from the Court for the prior seven weeks recovering from a heart attack,
made a point of being in Court on this day.89  When Warren announced that he was
about to read the long-awaited school desegregation decision, he saw “a general shift-
ing of positions in the crowded room and a rapt attention to my words.”90  Warren’s
intention in writing the Brown opinion was, as he privately told the other Justices, that
it “should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above
all, non-accusatory,”91 and it was this straightforward text (rather than a summary) that
82 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
83 Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 362–63 (2001); O’Brien, supra note 79, at 91–113. For an early effort to make sense of
this new trend in Supreme Court practice, see C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT
46–53 (1948).
84 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986);
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33 (1994); Greenhouse, Ginsburg,
supra  note 5 and accompanying text.
85 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
86 SCHWARTZ, supra note 74, at 18 (internal quotations omitted).
87 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 3 (1977).
89 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 701 (1976).
90 WARREN, supra note 88, at 3.
91 Memorandum from Chief Justice Earl Warren to the Members of the Court (May 7,
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he read aloud.  The decision began with a general discussion of the background to the
case and the relevant issues, with Warren not tipping his hand on which way the deci-
sion would go.  Several minutes into his reading he revealed the holding: “We come
then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible factors may
be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? 
We unanimously believe that it does.”92  The word “unanimously” was not in the writ-
ten opinion.93  Warren inserted it, by hand, into the draft that he read from the bench.94 
According to Warren, “When the word ‘unanimously’ was spoken, a wave of emotion
swept the room; no words or intentional movement, yet a distinct emotional manifesta-
tion that defies description.”95  While many observers had expected the Court to strike
down school segregation laws, the fact that Warren was able to get all nine Justices to
agree to this outcome came as a surprise to most.96  Warren’s insertion of the word
“unanimously” into his announcement highlighted the unified commitment of the
nine Justices behind the Brown decision.
More recent majority opinions have arrived in similarly dramatic fashion.  For
example, as Justice Kennedy read his opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas,97
the 2003 case that struck down anti-sodomy laws, supporters of the decision in the
courtroom—many of them gay and lesbian members of the Supreme Court bar—
reacted visibly.98  Kennedy’s oral statement and written opinion were notable not only
for the holding, but also for their absolute repudiation of the precedent that Lawrence
overruled, Bowers v. Hardwick,99 and for the respectful terms in which Kennedy dis-
cussed the intimate relationships of gay citizens.  “By the time [Kennedy] referred to
the dignity and respect to which he said gays were entitled,” reported Linda Greenhouse
of the New York Times, “several were weeping, silently but openly.”100
Not surprisingly, some of the most notable moments in the Supreme Court have
included oral dissents.  It would be hard to find a more anticipated and momentous day
than the announcement of Dred Scott v. Sandford.101  An increasingly divided nation
1954) (Earl Warren Papers, Container 571, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.).
92 WARREN, supra note 88, at 3.
93 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
94 Draft Opinion, Brown v. Bd. of Educ.(Earl Warren Papers, Container 571, Manuscripts
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (draft with inscription “Copy from which
C.J. read on Bench—5/17/54”).
95 WARREN, supra note 88, at 3; see also KLUGER, supra note 89, at 707.
96 Warren noted that after the decision “people would phone the Clerk’s Office and demand
to see the dissenting opinion.” WARREN, supra note 88, at 3.
97 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
98 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Legalize Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal
of Court’s ‘86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A1.
99 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
100 Greenhouse, supra note 98.
101 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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was turning to the Court to see how it would resolve the controversy over slavery
in the territories; never before had the Court assumed such a prominent position in a
national issue of such magnitude.102  Each Justice participating in the decision wrote
his own opinion and each read his opinion in Court.  The process took two full days
to complete.103
The anti-slavery New York Tribune described not just the content of the opinions,
but also the drama of their announcement.  On the opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Taney, who was in failing health by this point in his life, the paper wrote:
No wonder that the Chief Justice should have sunk his voice to a
whisper, conscious, as he must have been, that the decision which
he promulgated had been arrived at on grounds totally different
from those indicated in the opinion—that opinion being but a mere
collation of false statements and shallow sophistries, got together
to sustain a foregone conclusion,—knowing that he was engaged
in a pitiful attempt to impose upon the public.  However feeble his
voice might have been, what he had to say was still feebler.104
The Tribune also described the uncomfortable reactions of the Justices in the majority
when Justice Curtis read his dissenting opinion.  Justices Wayne and Daniel “seemed
as uneasy, while Judge Curtis was reading, as though they were listening to an
Abolition harangue.”105  Meanwhile, Justice Catron, whom the Tribune portrayed
102 See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 279–319 (rev. ed. 1926).
103 The mere spectacle of watching the Court intervene in such dramatic fashion on the
slavery dispute constituted a major event, but the fact that these bench announcements came
before all the written opinions had been finalized also ended up being historically significant.
Following the public announcement of the opinions, Chief Justice Taney spent two more weeks
revising his opinion. This caused considerable tension within the Court, since he refused to
let anyone, including the other Justices, see the revised draft before it was published. Justice
Curtis, who had made his opinion available to the press immediately following its announce-
ment, was particularly angry with the Chief Justice, since much of the revised material Taney
added was in response to Curtis’s influential dissenting opinion. Taney, in turn, accused Curtis
of purposely fomenting an “assault” on the Court through the circulation of his dissent in
partisan publications. When the final version of Taney’s opinion eventually came out, Curtis
believed that he had added over eighteen pages in direct response to his dissent. Curtis’s resig-
nation in the following months was in part brought about by what he viewed as Taney’s dis-
ingenuous dealings with his colleagues. STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL
WAR ERA: AT THE CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 145–49 (2005).
104 WARREN, supra note 88, at 305. In another attack on Taney, the Tribune was even more
direct in portraying his physical appearance as reflective of his misguided judicial views.
“[Taney] walks with inverted and hesitating steps. His forehead is contracted, his eye sunken
and his visage has a sinister expression.” Id. at 319.
105 Id. at 318.
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as a misguided simpleton, “listened with a good deal of respectful surprise to Judge
Curtis’s exposition of the fallacy of his deductions.”106
Other nineteenth-century opinion announcements likewise included noteworthy
oral dissents—sometimes so dramatic as to be shocking.  Justice John Marshall Harlan,
who earned a reputation as “The Great Dissenter,” often delivered emotional read-
ings of his dissenting opinions from the bench.107  In 1895, for example, in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,108 the Court held that Congress lacked the constitutional
authority to create a federal income tax.  The decision was monumental; it would even-
tually be overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment.109  But the scene at the Supreme
Court when the opinions were announced—a process that lasted three hours110—was
given an extra dramatic element because of Justice Harlan’s announcement of his dis-
sent in the case.  Harlan, according to the account in the New York Sun:
[P]ounded the desk, shook his finger under the noses of the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Field, turned more than once almost angrily
upon his colleagues of the majority, and expressed his dissent from
their conclusions in a tone and language more appropriate to a
stump speech at a Populist barbecue than to an opinion on a ques-
tion of law before the Supreme Court of the United States.111
Another newspaper reported that Harlan’s dissent sent the audience “into a state of
very undignified hilarity.”112
Dramatic oral dissents became even more common in the twentieth century.  Justice
James Clark McReynolds, for example, was not shy about oral dissents and during
the 1930s he spoke in increasingly vitriolic terms as a majority formed to uphold New
Deal programs.113  One reporter described McReynolds’s style of announcing his
106 Id.
107 David G. Farrelly, Justice Harlan’s Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S. CAL. L. REV.
175 (1951).
108 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
109 Farrelly, supra note 107, at 176.
110 Id.
111 Farrelly, supra note 107, at 177 (quoting CARL SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 451 (1943)); see also LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 171 (1999).
112 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 111, at 171 (quoting EVENING STAR (Washington), May 20,
1895). “Old lawyers who had practiced at that tribunal for more than a quarter of a century sat
aghast as sentence followed sentence,” reported the New York Tribune. Farrelly, supra note
107, at 177 (quoting NEW YORK TRIBUNE, May 21, 1895).
113 On McReynolds’s less-than-friendly attitude toward his fellow Justices, his clerks, and
anyone else he came across, see JOHN KNOX, THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A
YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR’S WASHINGTON (Dennis J. Hutchinson
& David J. Garrow eds., 2002).
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opinions as basically following the text of his opinion (which he had memorized)
but then “liberally interlard[ing] it with extemporaneous observations.”114
McReynolds’s most memorable decision-day performance took place on
February 18, 1935, when the Court handed down the Gold Clause Case, which up-
held a federal law abolishing the gold standard for currency.115  By the time Chief
Justice Hughes had finished his hour and a half reading of the majority opinion to
a packed courtroom, audience interest had dissipated and people were beginning to
leave.116  It was at this moment that, in the words of the New York Times reporter,
“Mr. Justice McReynolds, who had been leaning back with his eyes closed, sat for-
ward and began to speak,” paying “virtually no attention to his text.”117  “[T]he scene
was electrified,” reported another journalist, as the Justice “announced his inability to
accept the views of the court.”118  “The audience was spellbound, listening for every
word,” according to the Times.119  “[A]s he went on in his Southern voice, government
attorneys and others in the crowded benches leaned forward intently . . . .  Sarcasm
and irony were behind sentence after sentence as he went along.”120  Among the words
of condemnation that flowed from McReynolds that day, his most remarked upon
line was something to the effect that “the Constitution has gone!”121  He effectively
stole center stage, for a moment at least, from a Court that was soon to leave the aging
Justice behind.
C. The Heyday of the Oral Dissent: The Stone, Vinson, and Warren Courts
As the preceding subparts demonstrate, oral dissents are nothing new.  Moreover,
their significance and impact often appear to have as much to do with the emotional
delivery or quirky personality on display as with the legal importance of the dissent
itself.  This aspect of the public reception of oral dissents continued long after Justices
Harlan and McReynolds left the bench.
During the 1940s through the 1960s—through the Stone, Vinson, and Warren
Courts—oral dissents were relatively common and were often quite dramatic.  This
frequency and drama may have been due to the fact that during this era particularly
confident and loquacious men strode the halls of the Supreme Court.  Moreover, a
number of these Justices simply did not like each other.122  The resulting combustible
114 Supreme Court Upholds Social Security Act, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 1937, at 1.
115 Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
116 Gold O.K. Cheers New Deal, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1935, at 1.
117 Arthur Krock, Congress is Censured, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1935, at 1.
118 Gold O.K. Cheers New Deal, supra note 116.
119 Constitution Gone, Says M’Reynolds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1935, at 1.
120 Id.
121 Gold O.K. Cheers New Deal, supra note 116. Observers disputed exactly what he said.
Michael Allan Wolf, James Clark McReynolds, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 299 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
122 See, e.g., MASON, supra note 81, at 607–08.
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mixture of conflicting judicial philosophy and contentious personalities sometimes
exploded in open court on decision days.  “As personalities were traded in the oral
delivery of opinions,” wrote Chief Justice Stone’s biographer of the Court under
Stone’s leadership (1941–46), “the smoldering fires of controversy, long at work in the
conference, erupted into the open.”123  The press and academics took note of the sharp
rise in dissents as well as the increasingly antagonistic rhetoric that characterized the
Justices’ opinions124—a trend that seemed all the more divisive because it was played
out not just in formal written opinions, but also face to face and with an audience (many
with pens in hand) in the courtroom during the delivery of the Court’s decisions.  As
the New York Times reported following a particularly contentious line of decisions
in 1944, “Acid comments scattered through decisions and biting comments by one or
another member of the black-robed ‘brethren’ are causing gasps in the national capital,
where rows and disputes are never a novelty.”125
The modern heir to the oral dissenting tradition of Harlan and McReynolds was
Justice Hugo Black, who served on the Court from 1937 to 1971.  Like Harlan and
McReynolds, Black favored extemporaneous summaries of his opinions, and like
them, he drew attention to his performances with heartfelt emotion and with sweep-
ing, sometimes apocalyptic language.126  Justice Black’s direct and often passionate
bench announcements were sometimes likened to a lawyer’s closing argument before
a jury,127 a fitting description since Black began his career as a courtroom lawyer.
123 Id. at 606.
124 See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, The Coming of the New Dissent: The Supreme Court,
1942–43, 11 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1943); C. Herman Pritchett, The Divided Supreme Court,
1944–1945, 44 MICH. L. REV. 427 (1945); Dissents Marked in Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1944, at 1. Much of the editorial commentary surrounding the increasing number and
volume of dissenting opinions was critical of the trend. An Unstable Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1944, at 14 (criticizing the “vacillation and disagreement” reflected in the “recent
astonishing record of dissents on the Court”); Court Feud, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1944, at 8
(criticizing Black for simply going out of his way to mock and discredit a fellow Justice and
noting that “every time feuds of this sort break out into backbiting in official opinions the pres-
tige of the court necessarily sags.”); see, e.g., Self-Inflicted Wounds, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
1944, at 6 (“[T]he country expects something better than a display of wrath or even personal
irritation of its Supreme Court.”).
125 Lewis Wood, Supreme Court Split is Aired in Dissents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1944, at E6.
126 See, e.g., James E. Clayton, High Court Rules Out Public School Prayers in Six-to-One
Decision, WASH. POST, June 26, 1962, at A1 (“Justice Black began to read his opinion with
a great deal of emotion in his voice . . . .”).
127 As Arthur Goldberg told Black in 1965: “You’re still an Alabama jury lawyer who can’t
resist playing to the galleries.” Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 51 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). Black’s written opinions
also tended toward the clarity of expression and avoidance of legalistic jargon characteristic
of the most effective bench statements. See, e.g., ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A
BIOGRAPHY 276 (2d ed. 1997) (“Black is certainly popular with newspaper men because he
recently wrote a dissent in English as plain and simple and clear as a good running story on the
first page.” (quoting Heywood Broun)); see also Anthony Lewis, Justice Black at 75: Still
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In the long list of oral dissents Black delivered, his most notable performance
might have been in Brown v. Louisiana,128 a 1966 decision in which the Court struck
down breach-of-peace convictions for a civil rights protest in a library.  Black’s dis-
sent was noteworthy because it marked an apparent shift for a Justice who had earned
a reputation as a strong advocate of civil rights for African Americans.129  But the oral
presentation itself gained attention in part because of the dire and chastising tone he
adopted in his remarks from the bench.  Indeed, Black’s dissent garnered as much
attention as the Court’s holding, which was largely in line with previous Warren Court
decisions on civil rights protests.  Both the New York Times and the Washington Post
included a picture of Black, but no other Justice, in their articles.130  The Times noted
that Black, “[s]peaking extemporaneously much of the time . . . spent almost a half-
hour denouncing what he termed a threat to ‘public buildings such as libraries, school-
houses, fire departments, courthouses, and executive mansions.’”131  The Washington
Post was more descriptive: “Trembling with rage and shaking his finger at the court-
room audience, Black blistered the majority with a 30-minute verbal assault that made
his strongly phrased written dissent seem pale by comparison.”132  Black’s dissent gar-
nered considerable attention, both from supporters such as James J. Kilpatrick, who felt
the “thunderclap opinion[ ]” reflected an effort to “bring[ ] sanity back to the Supreme
Court,”133 and critics, such as the editors of the Chicago Defender, who questioned
both “the logic of his dissent and the passion with which he delivered it.”134
In contrast to Justice Black, Justice Felix Frankfurter treated opinion announce-
ments as an opportunity not so much for passion but for edification.  He favored long
extemporaneous lectures on the law.  The former Harvard law professor was such an
enthusiast of the tradition of delivering substantial announcements of opinions that
he once chastised Justice Black from the bench when Black gave an uncharacteristi-
cally brief statement of the result of a case in which he wrote the majority opinion.135 
the Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1961, at SM 13 (“Frequently, in a Black dissent, there is
an air of his standing alone against a hostile world—the despairing tone of one who has often
fought against long odds.”).
128 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
129 See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 127, at 43–44.
130 Negro Protests Upheld by Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1966, at 23; John P. MacKenzie,
Louisiana Sit-In Conviction Reversed, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1966, at A1.
131 Negro Protests Upheld by Court, supra note 130.
132 MacKenzie, supra note 130. In defense of Black, his loyal ex-clerk A.E. Dick Howard
explained that this was the way Black always read his opinions. A.E. Dick Howard, Mr. Justice
Black: The Negro Protest Movement and the Rule of Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1030, 1045 (1967).
133 James J. Kilpatrick, Op-Ed., Justice Black’s Library Case Dissent Clears Air, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1966, at A5.
134 Editorial, The Black Dissent, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, Mar. 14, 1966, at 13.
135 Anthony Lewis, High Drama in the High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1958, at SM 10.
Lewis also noted that on another occasion Frankfurter’s extended and extemporaneous remarks
in describing a majority opinion caused Chief Justice Warren, prior to announcing his dissent,
to note that Frankfurter’s comments were different from the argument contained in his written
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Justice Frankfurter’s lengthy dissents from the bench were also noteworthy because
they could be so irksome to his colleagues.  His disquisitions repeatedly stirred the
normally genial Warren to open anger in the courtroom.  On the closing day of the
1957 term, for example, Warren announced a one sentence, unsigned opinion in a case
in which the Court denied the appeals of two California death row inmates who sought
to challenge the procedure by which their sanity was determined.136  Frankfurter gave
what the New York Times characterized as an “impassioned”137 oral dissent attacking
the procedural deficiencies in a situation where “life hangs in the balance.”138  Accept-
ing some administrative “inconveniences” was “far better . . . than that the State of
California should have on its conscience a single execution that would be barbaric be-
cause the victim was in fact, though he had no opportunity to show it, mentally unfit
to meet his destiny.”139  Warren, a former California attorney general and governor,
came to the defense of his home state.  “Neither the judgment of this court nor that of
California is quite as savage as this dissent would indicate,” he responded.140  He went
on to defend California’s actions for several minutes before concluding, “I merely make
this statement because I don’t believe that this case is as bad as it might appear.”141
Another extemporaneous oral dissent by Justice Frankfurter so exasperated
Chief Justice Warren that he decided on the spur of the moment to announce his own
rebuttal—this in a relatively minor case in which he had not even written an opinion.142 
“[S]ince so much has been said here that was not in any written opinion,” Warren said
he wanted to offer some words.143  After summarizing the majority’s position at some-
what more length than Justice Potter Stewart had initially offered in announcing the
opinion of the Court, Warren then turned back to Frankfurter and asked if he wanted
opinion and that Warren’s dissent would be in response to the written opinion. Id. This event
foreshadowed the bench dramatics of 1961, when in two cases in which Warren had not written
an opinion he felt compelled to weigh in after Frankfurter’s oral dissent. See infra notes
142–154 and accompanying text.
136 Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 550 (1958).
137 Justices’ Debate Stirs the Capital, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1958, at 19.
138 Id. (quoting Caritativo, 357 U.S. at 558).
139 Id.
140 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
141 Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., Chief Justice Warren,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1974) (summarizing the incident). Warren was not the first Chief
Justice to take issue with Frankfurter’s bench lectures. Earlier in Frankfurter’s time on the
Court, an extended summary of one of his majority opinions led Chief Justice Stone to say: “By
God, Felix, if you had put all that stuff in the opinion, never in my life would I have agreed to
it.” DOUGLAS, supra note 77, at 40.
142 Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961) (reversing a criminal conviction when
the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it could not convict a defendant of both larceny and
receiving stolen property).
143 Dissent by Frankfurter Provokes Warren to Rebuttal From Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1961, at 1.
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to respond.  “The Chief Justice urges me to comment on what he said, but of course
I won’t,” Frankfurter said, “I have another case.”144  The Washington Post, which gave
the exchange front-page coverage, wrote that this “rare display of irritation” by the
Justices “showed again . . . that they are as human as the rest of us.”145
Less than a month later Warren and Frankfurter were at it again in what the
Chicago Tribune reporter described as “one of the bitterest scenes observed on the
Supreme court [sic] bench in recent years.”146  This encounter, like their argument over
the California mental fitness case, earned front page coverage in the New York Times
and the Washington Post.147  The Court had reversed, in a 5-4 decision, a murder con-
viction for prosecutorial misconduct.148  Frankfurter delivered an extemporaneous oral
dissent in which he accused the Court of “turning ‘a criminal appeal into a quest for
error.’”149  The Court’s holding, he asserted, was “indefensible.”150  Warren then said
that although he did not write an opinion in this case, he felt compelled to respond be-
cause what Frankfurter had just said “was not the dissenting opinion that was filed.”151 
Rather, Frankfurter’s oral dissent was “a lecture . . . a closing argument by the prose-
cutor to the jury properly made in the conference room, but not in the courtroom.”152 
Warren noted that “the purpose of reporting an opinion in the courtroom is to inform
the public and not for the purpose of degrading this court.”153  As the Tribune reported,
144 Id. The Washington Post reported Frankfurter’s response slightly differently, as “I’m
tempted to comment on what the Chief Justice has said but I won’t.” James E. Clayton, Burst of
Irritation Shows Justices Are Just as Human as Anyone Else, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1961, at A1.
145 Clayton, supra note 144. The Post reporter brought attention to the fact that the exchange
“will never make the casebooks because it was never written” and that “[s]uch statements from
Justices are few and far between.” Id.
146 Warren Flays Frankfurter on High Court, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 1961, at 4.
147 Anthony Lewis, Warren Says Frankfurter Degrades Court in Dissent, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1961, at 1; James E. Clayton, Justice Warren Chides Frankfurter for ‘Lecture’ on
Decision in Murder, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1961, at A1. Prior to the main event, Justices
Harlan and Black gave an opening performance in a First Amendment case in which the Court
upheld Illinois’ denial of admittance to the bar of George Anastaplo for refusing to answer
questions about the Communist Party. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Black gave one
of his typically passionate oral dissents, in which he noted that Anastaplo “made the mistake
of saying he believed fully in the Declaration of Independence.” Clayton, supra. Anastaplo had
cited the Declaration in support of his belief in the right to revolution. Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at
99–100. Harlan, who had already announced the majority decision in the case, felt compelled
to offer a rebuttal to Black’s dissent. He noted that the denial of the law license was not because
of Anastaplo’s commitment to the Declaration but because of his refusal to answer questions
about the Communist Party. Clayton, supra.
148 Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
149 Clayton, supra note 147.
150 Lewis, supra note 147.
151 Warren Flays Frankfurter on High Court, supra note 146.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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“When Warren finished his remarks to a court chamber almost electric with tension,
Frankfurter snapped back a one-sentence rejoinder: ‘I’ll leave it to the record.’”154
If nothing else, these exchanges showed Warren’s frustration with Frankfurter’s
style of delivering his oral opinions.  Yet a Washington Post reporter saw the incident
as indicative of underlying tensions among the Justices.155  “Justice Frankfurter never
reads what he has written but talks about it,” the reporter wrote.156  “He occasionally
goes beyond what he has written but he did not appear to stray much more yesterday
than he has in the past.”157  The reporter suggested that the divisions may have been
more than stylistic, reflecting “ideological divisions which have been sharpened this
year because of the divisive and controversial cases which the Court must decide.”158
Ideological divisions were certainly on display when Chief Justice Warren an-
nounced Miranda v. Arizona,159 one of the most controversial opinions of his tenure. 
He read the entire sixty-one page majority opinion, a process that took over an hour.160 
He delivered the opinion with “emotion in his voice,”161 and he interspersed his pre-
sentation with extemporaneous comments to the courtroom.162  Justice Harlan read his
dissent, “his face flushed and his voice occasionally faltering with emotion.”163  In this
case, the New York Times noted, the emotion of both Warren and Harlan “bespoke the
deep division in the Court over the new doctrine.”164
Another notable oral dissenter was Justice Douglas, who could deliver a scathing
denunciation of a majority opinion.165  Douglas’s oral dissents often appeared to be
motivated as much by emotion as by ideological disagreement or by the legal sig-
nificance of the case.  In 1959, for instance, Douglas lashed out at Justice Charles E.
154 Id. The tension was apparently transient. Anthony Lewis noted seeing Warren and
Frankfurter “conversing amiably” later in the session. Lewis, supra note 147.
155 Clayton, supra note 147.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
160 John P. MacKenzie, High Court Curbs Police Questioning, WASH. POST, June 14,
1966, at A1.
161 Fred P. Graham, High Court Puts New Curb on Powers of the Police to Interrogate
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1966, at 1.
162 Warren departed from his text, for example, to praise the police “when their services are
honorably performed.” Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, High Court Backs Conviction of 32 in Rights Protest, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1 (reporting Douglas’s oral dissent in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39 (1966), and describing it as delivered “extemporaneously in a quiet, passionate voice”);
High Court Backs U.S. Expatriation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1958, at 22 (noting Douglas’s oral
dissent in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (upholding congressional power to expatriate
a U.S. citizen who voted in a foreign election), which included a critical and hyperbolic assess-
ment of the majority opinion as “perhaps the most important constitutional pronouncement
of this century”).
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Whittaker.166  The New York Times, in a story headlined “Douglas Berates a Fellow
Justice,” described Douglas as “pale with anger” after listening to Whittaker’s con-
currence in a railroad injury case in which he poked fun at Douglas’s dissenting
argument.167  “The case is rather an important one,” Douglas stated.  “It cannot be
dismissed by this attempted humor.”168  He went on to indicate that he believed
Whittaker had not even read the record of the case and that the seriousness of the
issue was demeaned by the “rather smart-alecky things that have been said.”169
In another case, several years later, the object of Douglas’s anger was an opinion
by his usual ally, Justice Black.  In extemporaneous remarks that, according to the New
York Times, “startled those in the courtroom,”170 Douglas accused his colleague of writ-
ing an opinion that sounded “more like a Congressional committee report than a judi-
cial opinion.”171  “[O]ne gets lost in [the] words” of Black’s opinion, he complained.172 
Despite the routine nature of the case being discussed (a water rights dispute between
Arizona and California), the event earned front page coverage in the Times, with the
headline Douglas Upbraids Black From Bench.173  The report included speculation
that the incident reflected the growing distance between Douglas and Black and might
presage a retirement announcement from the obviously frustrated Douglas.174
D. Learning from History
Interesting as these stories are in their own right for students of history and court
watchers alike, they also enrich our understanding of the evolution of the opinion
announcement process in general and of the oral dissent in particular.175  Perhaps
166 Douglas Berates a Fellow Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1959, at 25.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Douglas Upbraids Black From Bench, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1963, at 1.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Frankfurter, Harlan, and Douglas had no
monopoly on generating emotional or awkward moments. For example, in a 1950 case in-
volving the government’s refusal to allow the German wife of a World War II veteran to come
into the United States because of national security concerns, United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), Justice Jackson delivered an oral dissent denouncing the
actions of the U.S. Attorney General. The Attorney General in question, Tom Clark, was a
newly appointed Associate Justice and was sitting right next to Jackson. Jackson, in an oral
dissent one report described as “caustic,” characterized the decision to exclude this woman
as “abrupt and brutal” and the decision of the Attorney General to exclude her without hearing
as a “menace to free institutions.” Lewis Wood, U.S. Upheld on Bar to Alien Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1950, at 16; see also Knauff, 338 U.S. at 550, 550–51 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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most surprising to today’s observers, these stories demonstrate that, at least during the
Warren Court, decision days were sometimes occasions of actual unscripted colloquies
between the Justices.  What we know about these moments in the courtroom also dem-
onstrates the wide variety of purposes and motivations that led Justices to speak from
the bench—and that in turn generated press coverage.  But perhaps one of the most
striking aspects of the historical record is the evidence that even in this era of lively
and passionate public displays of disagreement and ideological division on the Court,
oral dissents were underreported.  This subpart explores these lessons.
1. Underreporting
Contrary to the assumptions of scholars and commentators, oral dissents have not
been consistently reported in the press.176  Consider the coverage of Justice Black, one
of the most frequent and forceful oral dissenters.  It is likely that many and perhaps
most of Black’s oral dissents failed to even earn mention in most contemporary news
accounts.  For example, the fact that Black gave an angry oral dissent in Bartkus v.
Illinois,177 in which the Court held that prosecution by the state and federal govern-
ments for the same crime does not violate the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause,
was not reported at all in many news accounts and was mentioned only briefly in the
New York Times at the time of the opinion.178  Similarly, Black’s reading of his dis-
sent in a 1950 case involving a domestic loyalty program,179 which, according to one
observer, he delivered “in a voice of scorn and steel,”180 did not appear in the major
news accounts of the Court’s decision.181  This lack of media attention was not for want
176 It is, of course, impossible to know which and how many oral dissents went unmen-
tioned because we do not have reliable information about all of the cases in which there were
oral dissents.
177 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
178 Black’s oral dissent was not mentioned in Richard L. Lyons, State and U.S. Trials for
Same Crime Declared Legal by Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1959, at A1 or in
Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Twice ‘in Jeopardy of Life or Limb’ Under the Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1959, at 30. It was mentioned in Lewis, supra note 147 (“The importance and diffi-
culty of the problems involved were also made dramatically clear in the courtroom today. The
justices stated their opinions at length and with deep feeling.”). In this article, Lewis mentioned
only that there were emotional oral opinions; he said nothing about their content. Lewis re-
turned to the Bartkus opinion, however, in a 1961 profile of Justice Black. Lewis, supra note
127. In that piece, he quoted a dialogue between Frankfurter and Black that, as far as we can
tell, appeared nowhere in the immediate press coverage of Bartkus. “Justice Frankfurter,”
Lewis wrote, “in stating his opinion for the majority, made a passing reference to ‘the so-called
Bill of Rights.’ When Justice Black read his dissent, his voice rang with passion as he said:
‘This case concerns the Bill of Rights, not the so-called Bill of Rights.’” Id.
179 Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
180 John P. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1949–50, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44
(1950) (quoting a letter from an unnamed “courtroom observer”).
181 See Philip Dodd, Supreme Court OK’s Conviction of Red Leader, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28,
1950, at 5; Red Secretary’s Conviction Upheld, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1950, at 1; Chalmers
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of drama.  Black’s biographer writes that in delivering this particular dissent, Black
“turned to Solicitor General Philip Perlman, not one of his favorites, looked at him
coldly, lowered his voice and said scornfully, ‘Nor should the government want such
an unfair advantage,’” leading the solicitor general to “turn[ ] several shades of red.”182 
The biographer also notes that Black made additional notations on his reading draft
of his dissent in Feiner v. New York183—an indication that not only did he most likely
read the dissent but he appeared to add some additional substantive commentary—
yet this was another case in which the major news accounts did not find worthy of
mention that Black read his dissent.184
It could be, of course, that the frequency with which Black dissented from the
bench made his pronouncements less noteworthy in the eyes of the press.  Or it could
be that during this period of relatively frequent oral dissents, any single such demon-
stration (by any Justice) was not as notable as it might be in a period with fewer oral
dissents.  The more oral dissents that there are, the less likely it may be that any par-
ticular outburst might be considered news.  It would not be surprising, then, if dur-
ing the Stone, Vinson, and Warren years, a significant but unknown number of oral
dissents went unmentioned in the press.
2. Diverse Motivations
A second lesson from history is that the Justices are motivated to speak from
the bench for a variety of reasons.  Unquestionably, some oral dissents, like Justice
McReynolds’s famous outburst in the Gold Clause Case,185 evidence profound dis-
tress at the direction the Court is taking and a desire to expose the evils of that direc-
tion to the public.186  McReynolds, in fact, went so far as to publish a version of his
bench dissent in the Wall Street Journal in order to publicize his views.187  Other
oral dissents arise in insignificant cases and reflect interpersonal tensions or irascible
personalities.  Some of Justice Douglas’s bench statements and the clashes between
Warren and Frankfurter appear to fit this mold.
M. Roberts, Conviction of Dennis Sustained, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1950, at 1; Lewis Wood,
Dennis Contempt Held Tried Fairly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1950, at 4.
182 NEWMAN, supra note 127, at 400.
183 340 U.S. 315 (1951); NEWMAN, supra note 127, at 401–02.
184 See Philip Dodd, Court Affirms Right to Speak; Bans Violence, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16,
1951, at 17; Murrey Marder, Court Decides Against Political Speaker But Upholds Rights
in Two Religious Cases, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1951, at 1; Jay Walz, High Court Voids City’s
Ordinance Requiring Street Preaching Permit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1951, at 1.
185 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
186 See supra notes 115–121 and accompanying text.
187 Justice McReynolds’ Remarks on Gold Case Decision, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1935, at
1. This version includes the Justice’s explanation for putting aside his written opinion in favor
of more informal comments. Rather than “covering [the situation] in a thousand words” he
wished to offer “a plain, simple tale that you may understand without difficulty.” Id.
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3. Public Appeal
The differences in Justices’ motivations for dissenting from the bench and the in-
consistent reporting in the press are mirrored by the unpredictability with which some
oral dissents become the stuff of Supreme Court legend.  Some oral dissents became
famous because they were emblematic of significant ideological struggles.  Consider
the fallout from Justice Harlan’s oral dissent in Pollock in 1895.188  According to one
later study of this famous dissent, in the contemporary press Harlan’s “performance
was unanimously condemned.”189  The Nation published a critical article titled “Justice
Harlan’s Harangue,” in which it criticized how “unbecoming the Justice’s behavior
was.”190  For the editors of this journal, the Justice’s behavior was a demonstration of
a larger issue, the national struggle taking place over social legislation: “The heat with
which Justice Harlan . . . expounded the Marx gospel from the bench showed the brake
was applied none too soon.”191  In linking an attack on Harlan’s “unbecoming” judicial
behavior with a critique of his constitutional position, the Nation created an attractive
proxy through which to challenge a fervent and increasingly powerful movement for
increased economic regulation.
Oral dissents likewise seemed to take on a broader significance if they served the
role of encapsulating for observers story lines that were attractive for reasons having
nothing to do with the fact or content of the oral dissents themselves.  Justice Douglas’s
notoriously prickly personality, for example, was neatly illustrated by his angry
pronouncements in relatively insignificant cases.192
Nor are these categories mutually exclusive.  So, for example, Justice
McReynolds’s declaration that “the Constitution is gone!”193 appeared in practically
all the retrospectives about his life, demonstrating not only his reactionary constitu-
tional commitments—“the unchangeableness that was McReynolds”194—but the pas-
sion with which he held to them.  “This fervid dissent,” recalled Solicitor General
Philip B. Perlman in memorializing McReynolds in 1948, two years after his death,
“accords with the view he himself had expressed many years before in another dis-
senting opinion that ‘an amorphous dummy, unspotted by human emotions’ is not ‘a
becoming receptacle for judicial power.’”195
188 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
189 Farrelly, supra note 107, at 178.
190 Justice Harlan’s Harangue, NATION, May 30, 1895, at 417.
191 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 175 (2009) (quoting
Editorial, The Income Tax Decision, NATION, May 23, 1895, at 394).
192 See supra text accompanying notes 165–74.
193 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
194 Philip B. Perlman, Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States, In Memory
of Mr. Justice McReynolds, 334 U.S. v, ix (1948).
195 Id. at xi; see also Dean Acheson, McReynolds, a Terror in Court, Was a Kindly Man,
WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1965, at A18; Gold O.K. Cheers New Deal, supra note 116. This
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One final lesson of the press coverage from earlier years is that a Justice cannot
control or predict the course (if any) of public response to the dissent.  In fact, observers
may not even agree on what happened in the courtroom.  There was widespread dis-
agreement over precisely what McReynolds said about the demise of the Constitution
in his Gold Clause Case oral dissent.196  The announcement of the Steel Seizure Case197
on June 2, 1952, likewise spawned competing accounts of “perhaps the most important
[case] to come from the court in this century if not since the Dred Scott decision. . . .”198 
Justice Black announced the opinion of the Court, which took less than fifteen min-
utes.199  One account noted that Black read “in a calm, low voice,” while the Solicitor
General, who had argued on the losing side of the case, “listened glumly.”200  Justice
Frankfurter then followed with a thirty minute summary of his concurring opinion,
during which, according to the New York Times reporter, he “scarcely referred to the
printed page, except near the end of his opinion.”201  Chief Justice Vinson then an-
nounced his dissent, which took over an hour to complete.  The reporters covering the
event for the New York Times and the Washington Post differed, however, in how to
describe Vinson’s tone and attitude.  Both agreed that his announcement was marked
by sarcasm toward his fellow Justices, several of whom he singled out for inconsis-
tencies in their positions on executive power.202  But while the Post reporter described
these remarks as showing “considerable scorn for his judicial brethren quite . . . ob-
vious to those in the crowded courtroom,”203 the Times reporter labeled them “friendly
sarcasm,” noting that at one point during Vinson’s performance Justice Black caught
memorial accorded with the conservative Chicago Tribune, which had lauded McReynolds’s
“inspired” performance as characterized by “elegance and great feeling,” and predicted that
it would earn the Justice “immortality in the annals of jurisprudence.”
196 Justice McReynolds’ Remarks on Gold Case Decision, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1935, at 1
(“No official stenographic report of the Justice’s observations was made. They have hitherto
been reported only fragmentarily and it was feared that they were lost to posterity.”).
197 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
198 Chalmers M. Roberts, Vinson, Minton, Reed Dissent as Black Delivers Majority Opinion,
WASH. POST, June 3, 1952, at 1.
199 Joseph A. Loftus, Black Gives Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1952, at 1.
200 John Fisher, Steel Shutdown Under Way: Truman’s Seizure of Industry Voided by
Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1952, at 1.
201 Loftus, supra note 199. In these spoken comments, Frankfurter “did not follow the pre-
cise language of his opinion.” Id. The Times noted a couple deviations from his text (including
the use of the expression “almost a suckling knows that,” although the Times reporter noted
that it was not clear to what Frankfurter was referring in this instance). Id. In his oral concur-
rence, Frankfurter also came to the defense of John W. Davis, who had argued for the steel
companies in the case, and who Vinson in his dissent accused of inconsistency since he had
asserted contrary legal arguments in a brief he wrote as Solicitor General in 1914. Id.
202 Id; see also Roberts, supra note 198. Justices Clark and Jackson had both served as
Attorney General prior to coming to the Court, at which time both were on record as advocating
for a more expansive view of the President’s power. Loftus, supra note 199.
203 Roberts, supra note 198.
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Jackson’s eye and both grinned and that at another point Vinson’s criticisms caused
“a spontaneous burst of laughter” in the courtroom, in which Jackson joined.204
If nothing else, the history of oral dissents through the Warren Court demonstrates
the hazards of generalizing about the phenomenon.  Even contemporary observers often
could not agree on what happened and whether it was of public significance.  These
features of oral dissents should, at a minimum, give us pause when trying to identify
the predictors of oral dissents or when making claims about their likely impact.
III. THE MODERN ERA: THE BURGER, REHNQUIST, AND ROBERTS COURTS
The study of oral dissents in the years following the Warren Court benefits greatly
from the work of Jill Duffy, a librarian at the Supreme Court, and Elizabeth Lambert,
a staff attorney for the District Court of the Eastern District of New York.  Duffy and
Lambert have set out to create the most comprehensive possible list of oral dissents
from the beginning of the Burger Court in 1969 to the present,205 drawing on press cov-
erage, other published mentions of oral dissents, and at times, the Justices’ papers,206
as well as recordings of opinion announcements.207  From October Term 1969 through
October Term 2008, Lambert and Duffy have identified a total of 116 oral dissents in
110 cases.  The HMR authors identified one additional case—Missouri v. Jenkins208—
giving us a total of 111 cases.  Table I lists the distribution of these cases—and of oral
dissents—across the 1969 to 2008 Terms.
Although this list of 111 cases is the most comprehensive we know of, it is likely
incomplete.  Duffy and Lambert have listened to opinion announcements in only about
half of all Supreme Court cases for the Terms they are studying.209  Some recordings
may not even exist.210  Nonetheless, the list provides us with a valuable vantage point
from which to view the more contemporary Justices’ use of oral dissents and their
reception by the press and the public.
204 Loftus, supra note 199.
205 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 8.
206 Id. at 11.
207 Many such recordings are available on the Oyez website and Oyez is in the process of
uploading recordings of all opinion announcements that exist at the National Archives Records
Administration. Id. at 8, 13.
208 495 U.S. 33 (1990). Missouri v. Jenkins was identified by the HMR authors, who gen-
erously shared their list of cases with us.  Technically, Justice Kennedy’s opinion was not a
dissent, but was a concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment. Id. at 59. Substantively,
it was a dissent.
209 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 16. As of their summer 2009 posting, they had
listened to 49% of opinion announcements from the October 1969 Term through the October
2007 Term. Nor were those 49% of cases evenly distributed. For some Terms, they had
listened to as much as 99% of the opinion hand-downs, while, at the low end, the percentages
ranged from 0% to 34%. Id.
210 Id. at 13 (noting that during the 1980s, the Supreme Court did not deliver all recordings
of opinion announcements to National Archives Records Administration).
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TABLE I: ORAL DISSENTS PER COURT TERM
Court Term Cases with Oral Dissents Oral Dissents
1969: Burger Court 4 4
1970 4 4
1971 1 2
1972 2 2
1973 5 6
1974 1 1
1975 6 6
1976 3 6
1977 6 6
1978 3 3
1979 2 2
1980 2 2
1981 2 2
1982 1 1
1983 2 2
1984 0 0
1985 1 1
1986: Rehnquist Court 1 1
1987 1 1
1988 2 2
1989 2 2
1990 3 3
1991 2 2
1992 3 3
1993 2 2
1994 2 2
1995 2 2
1996 2 2
1997 2 2
1998 6 6
1999 3 4
2000 2 2
2001 4 4
2002 4 4
2003 6 6
2004 4 4
2005: Roberts Court 3 3
2006 7 7
2007 2 2
2008 3 3
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A. The Fall and Rise of the Oral Dissent
The appointment of Warren Burger as Chief Justice marked the beginning of a
trend toward limiting the use of oral dissents and, more generally, toward making deci-
sion announcements less noteworthy than they had been in previous decades.  Burger
advocated that the Court should abandon what he termed the “archaic practice” of
reading opinions from the bench.211  Most of the other Justices resisted.  They even-
tually agreed to avoid the reading of opinions in favor of a policy of announcing only
summaries—but not all Justices liked even this change.212
Unable to get the Court to agree to his original proposal, Burger sought on his own
to downplay any sort of public spectacle associated with decision day at the Court.  In
most cases in which he wrote the majority opinion, he simply announced the judgment,
providing no additional summary of the Court’s reasoning.213  Even in a case as sig-
nificant as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education214—which Newsweek
called “by far the most momentous Court pronouncement on school segregation since
the landmark Brown decision of 1954”—Burger read only a summary of the opinion
and its holding.215
211 O’BRIEN, supra note 78, at 312. The idea to end the tradition of having the Justices
announce their opinions from the bench might have come to Burger from his childhood friend
and future colleague Harry Blackmun. Upon his appointment in 1969, Burger wrote Blackmun,
who was then a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, asking for advice.
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT
JOURNEY 42 (2005). Blackmun responded with an eight-page single-spaced memorandum with
suggestions for reforming the Court, which included a proposal for getting rid of opinion
announcements. Id. at 42–43. Other courts did not announce their opinions, Blackmun
observed, and the Supreme Court’s practice was an “anachronism” and a waste of time. Id.
at 43. Greenhouse notes the irony of Blackmun’s suggestion, since he would eventually become
an enthusiastic practitioner of the oral dissent. Id.
212 Unsurprisingly, Justice Black in particular did not favor Burger’s proposed changes.
O’BRIEN, supra note 78, at 311–12.
213 SCHWARTZ, supra note 74, at 63–64.
214 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
215 SCHWARTZ, supra note 74, at 63–64. Burger’s expressed disdain for bench opinions did
not prevent him from on occasion issuing his own oral dissent. He delivered one, for example,
in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a case in which the Court reaffirmed its ruling
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Burger’s oral dissent was noted in news accounts
of the decision: one report described him as “angry,” Caroline Rand Herron & R.V. Denenberg,
The Nation: Affirmation of Miranda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1977, at 150; another as “emotional,”
Lesley Oelsner, Justices Spurn States’ Plea to Void Miranda Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1977, at A1. See also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 401 (1994) (describ-
ing Burger taking “the unusual step of delivering his opinion orally, glaring down the bench
at Powell as he read excerpts from his dissent”).
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Burger was not alone in his efforts to tone down the bench dramatics in the
announcing of opinions.  Brennan was on record as asserting that judicial opinions
“must stand on their own merits without embellishment or comment from the judges
who write or join them.”216  True to his word, Brennan almost never delivered an oral
dissent.217  Justice White followed Burger’s practice in majority opinion announce-
ments, generally stating only that the lower court was affirmed (or reversed) “for rea-
sons on file with the Clerk”218—although White also delivered a handful of notable
oral dissents, including one in Roe v. Wade.219
Despite Burger’s efforts, however, the number of oral dissents issued each Term
remained fairly high during the beginning of his tenure.220  Justices Black and Douglas
each continued to dissent from the bench as many as three times a Term until their
retirements in 1971 and 1975, respectively.221  Justice Stewart also was a relatively
prolific oral dissenter; he dissented from the bench at least four times in each of October
Burger perhaps had reason to disdain bench performances, since he seemed to have a
propensity for finding himself in an uncomfortable position on decision day. In 1978, for
example, he was made the target of a Justice’s bench announcement. This time it was Justice
Stewart’s oral dissent in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), in which the Court had
held that a state judge who approved the sterilization of a fifteen-year-old girl without her
knowledge or consent was immune from a damage suit. Although Justice White had written
the majority opinion, the Washington Post reporter singled out Burger’s reaction to Stewart’s
oral dissent as one of the stories of the day: “Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, one of the
majority, was at Stewart’s right as the dissenter spoke in a strong, controlled voice. As one
cutting phrase tumbled on another, Burger’s face reddened. Other justices also appeared to
be uncomfortable. The tension struck observers as almost palpable.” Morton Mintz, High
Court Rules Judge Isn’t Liable, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1978, at A1. The selective nature of
the coverage of oral dissents can be seen by the fact that the New York Times reporter made
no note of this “almost palpable” tension in the courtroom; in fact, he did not even mention
that Stewart’s dissent was read from the bench. Warren Weaver, Jr., High Court Rules Judge
Immune to Lawsuit in Girl’s Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1978, at A18.
216 O’BRIEN, supra note 78, at 313; see also Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 14 (quoting
from a January 17, 1973, memorandum from Brennan to Blackmun in which Brennan wrote:
“Our practice in the past has always been not to record [i.e., preserve in writing] oral announce-
ments of opinions in order to avoid the possibility that the announcement will be relied upon
as the opinion or as interpreting the filed opinion.”).
217 The only Brennan oral dissent that either Duffy and Lambert or we could locate was
in Bakke. Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 25.
218 O’BRIEN, supra note 78, at 313. White, for example, was the only Justice who wrote
an opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) but did
not summarize it from the bench. Four other oral dissents were issued that day. Duffy &
Lambert, supra note 14, at 25–26 (noting oral dissents by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens).
219 See Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 10–11.
220 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 23–27.
221 Id. at 23–25.
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Term 1973 and 1977 alone.222  Stewart reportedly held a “firm conviction that the
republic deserves an explanation of where its Supreme Court Justices stand on an
issue—and why—[which] manifested itself in his policy of reading his dissents from
the bench.”223
By the late 1970s, however, and certainly after Justice Stewart’s retirement in 1981,
oral dissents became much rarer than they had been in previous decades.  Newspaper
accounts began to describe oral dissents as “unusual”224 and “rare.”225  “In recent years,”
a Washington Post reporter wrote in 1978, “dissenters only infrequently have given
opinions from the bench.”226  The Justices themselves became more self-conscious
about the decision to dissent from the bench.  Beginning an oral dissent in a 1979
case,227 Justice Powell explained: “I exercise the privilege we have—though rarely
used—to dissent orally.  This is a uniquely important case. . . .”228  In the 1983 case
of INS v. Chadha,229 Justice White opened his oral dissent by stating: “I have not
spoken orally in dissent in many years. . . .  But this is no ordinary case.”230
222 Id. at 24–27.
223 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 1566–67 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Justice Stewart:
A Tale of Two Portraits, 95 YALE L.J. 1328, 1331 (1986)). When Justice Stevens joined the
Court in 1975, Justice Stewart told him “that John Harlan had asked him to make sure to
preserve the tradition of making at least one oral announcement of a dissenting opinion each
Term.” Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 9 n.9 (quoting John Paul Stevens, Random
Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 272 (2005)). Justice Stevens, along with Justice
White, then “advised Justice Scalia of that tradition” shortly before Justice Scalia gave his
first dissent from the bench in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Id.
224 See, e.g., Blackmun, in Unusual Action, Denounces 5-to-4 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1976, at 70 (describing Blackmun’s oral dissent in United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429
U.S. 32 (1976), as “an unusual statement from the bench”); Oelsner, supra note 215 (describing
Burger’s oral dissent in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), as an “unusual step”).
225 See, e.g., Morton Mintz, High Court, 5-4, Rejects Dilution of Miranda Rule, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 1977, at A1 (describing Burger’s oral dissent in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977), as a “rare action”); Al Kamen, Stricter Limits Set on Inmates’ Rights, WASH.
POST, July 4, 1984, at A1 (describing Justice Stevens “tak[ing] the rare step of reading a
dissent from the bench” in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)).
226 Mintz, supra note 215 (describing, inter alia, Justice Stewart’s oral dissent in Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)).
227 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
228 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 7.
229 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
230 Fred Barbash, Decision Alters Balance of Power in Government, WASH. POST, June 24,
1983, at A1. Justice White’s oral dissent stirred Chief Justice Burger to break from his practice
of stating nothing more than the Court’s holding in announcing an opinion. Burger, the author
of the majority decision, initially had delivered nothing more than a brief statement of the result
in the case. But White’s strongly worded oral dissent was followed by an awkward moment
of silence, which Burger then filled with an extemporaneous explanation of the majority’s
decision. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 7-2, Restricts Congress’s Right to Overrule
Actions by Executive Branch, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1983, at A1. “The courtroom was half
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was first appointed as an Associate Justice in 1973
and who succeeded Burger as Chief in 1986, followed in his predecessor’s footsteps
when it came to oral dissents.  There is reliable evidence of him orally dissenting
only once during more than three decades on the Court.231  Nor did other Justices fre-
quently dissent from the bench during the 1980s.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor did
not announce her first oral dissent until 1991, a decade after her appointment to the
Court.232  By 1987, Justice Blackmun estimated that “about once a year, a dissent is
announced from the bench,”233 and by this point, his estimate appears to be about
right.234  From October Term 1980 through October Term 1989, there is evidence of
an average of fewer than 1.4 oral dissents per Term; in October Term 1984, there is
no record of any oral dissent.235
The 1990s appeared to bring a mild increase in oral dissents,236 with two or three
known instances of oral dissents in each of the years between October Term 1990 and
1997.237  And in the late 1990s, the numbers began to increase some more.  October
Term 1998 saw six oral dissents, in five different cases.238  For the remainder of the
Rehnquist Court, the number of oral dissents per term fluctuated between two and
four, with the exception of October Term 2003, when there were six oral dissents in
five different cases.239  Since the advent of the Roberts Court in October Term 2005,
empty,” Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times reported, “and it was unlikely that many
of the tourists present knew what an unusual event they had happened upon.” Id.
231 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). This is the only
confirmed oral dissent Rehnquist issued, although Duffy and Lambert note that some have
claimed that Rehnquist also read his dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Duffy &
Lambert, supra note 14, at 16–17. They could find no confirming evidence, however.
232 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY
O’CONNOR 251 (2005); Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 21.
233 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 17 n.58 (quoting In Search of the Constitution with
Bill Moyers: Justice Harry A. Blackmun (PBS television broadcast April 26, 1987)). The
comment was in response to a question about Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in
which Blackmun delivered an oral dissent. Id.
234 See Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 27–28 (locating two oral dissents in October Term
1980, two in 1981, one in 1982, two in 1983, none in 1984, and one in 1985, 1986, and 1987).
235 Id. at 21–23.
236 Of course this increase, as reported by Duffy and Lambert, might be explained by the
increase in recordings of bench announcements, so that by the 1990s fewer oral dissents were
lost to history. See Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 13–16, 29–33.
237 Id. at 29–31.
238 Id. at 32; see also Joan Biskupic, Voicing Supreme Dissent: Rare, Loud, and Clear,
WASH. POST, July 5, 1999, at A19 (describing the “extraordinary hour of statements from the
bench” on the last day of the term, which included three oral dissents); Linda Greenhouse,
States are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A1
(describing the last day of the term as a “scene of extraordinary drama” which “held the
audience spellbound”).
239 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 32–35.
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oral dissents seem to have re-emerged as an important feature of the announcement
of controversial decisions, although Chief Justice Roberts himself has yet to dissent
from the bench.  The high water mark to date was October Term 2006—the Term that
sparked much of the current interest in oral dissents—when there were seven oral
dissents, each in a separate case.240
B. The More Things Change . . .
When viewed in a long-term perspective it is more accurate to identify the prac-
tices of the late Burger and Rehnquist Courts, with only a few reported oral dissents
per term, as the aberrant period in the history of Supreme Court bench announcements. 
The apparent recent uptick in oral dissenting in the Roberts Court is more a return to
past practice than an innovation.  The oral dissents of recent years also reinforce the
patterns we have identified in the historical record.  The Roberts Court’s oral dissent
practices offer yet more examples of the diverse nature of these bench statements.  An
individual Justice may have different intentions for different oral dissents, practices
vary from Justice to Justice, and over time changes in the Court’s culture and customs
make for different approaches to oral dissenting.  Furthermore, oral dissents continue
to be underreported in the mainstream press.  And finally, the public significance of an
oral dissent remains unpredictable.  Efforts to identify the factors behind an oral dis-
sent that resonates with the public must take into account not only the variety of types
of oral dissents, but also the role of extrajudicial actors in interpreting and disseminat-
ing the oral dissent.
1. The Perils of Generalizing
Oral dissents can take many different forms and Justices deliver them with many
different goals in mind.  The sometimes conflicting conclusions of the HMR authors
and Blake and Hacker hint at this reality.  Consistent with HMR, there are numerous
examples of oral dissents characterized by ideological distance between the dissenter
and the majority opinion author.  Justice Stevens’s dissent in Printz v. United States,241
for example, fits this mold.  In Printz, Stevens attacked Justice Scalia’s majority opin-
ion, which invalidated parts of the Brady gun control law, for its expansive reading of
the 10th Amendment at the expense of congressional power.242  Stevens is regularly
240 Id. at 36. Whether in fact “[o]ral dissents have enjoyed a resurgence over the last few
years,” Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 15, remains to be seen. The annual totals for the
period from October Term 2000 to October Term 2008 (2, 4, 4, 6, 4, 3, 7, 2, 3) show no clear
trend, although the yearly average has appeared to increase slightly from the 1990s. Duffy &
Lambert, supra note 14, at 29–37.
241 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
242 Id. at 939–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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identified as the most liberal member in the latter years of the Rehnquist Court, while
Scalia is one of the most conservative.243  And during the Rehnquist Court, there were
many such cases in which Justices from the liberal wing orally (and bitterly) dissented
from conservative holdings announced by the more conservative Justices.244
On the other hand, there are numerous examples to illustrate Blake and Hacker’s
finding that oral dissents are more likely when the ideological distance between
dissenter and majority author is smaller.245  Many of these cases are 5-4 decisions
in which the majority author is the swing Justice—often either Justice O’Connor or
Justice Kennedy.  Since these Justices are situated at the middle of the Court, the ideo-
logical distance between them and any dissenter is necessarily smaller than in cases
like Printz, in which the Justices writing the opinions are at the extremes at both ends
of the spectrum.  In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,246 for example,
Justice O’Connor announced the opinion of the Court allowing a student to sue a
school district for failing to adequately address sexual harassment of the plaintiff by
a fellow student.  Justice Kennedy, who is widely seen as only slightly more conser-
vative than O’Connor, dissented from the bench.247  In such cases, it seems plausible
that the oral dissent is motivated at least in part by frustration at the dissenter’s failure
to persuade a frequent ally, as Blake and Hacker hypothesize.248
Not surprisingly, both sets of empirical scholars conclude that oral dissents are
more likely in closely decided cases.  Even casual court watchers can identify any
number of such cases (Printz, Davis, Ricci, Citizens United, and Parents Involved
are only a few).  But again, the “typical” case does not tell the whole story.  Justice
O’Connor and Justice Scalia each issued their first oral dissent in cases in which they
were the lone dissenter.249  In City of Boerne v. Flores,250 the second of only three
243 See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134,
145, 147 (2002); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Justice Stevens Retiring, Giving
Obama a 2nd Pick, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1; Richard L. Hasen, Scalia’s Retirement
Party, SLATE, Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2250579.
244 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (majority opinion by Justice Scalia;
dissent by Justice Stevens); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (majority
opinion by Justice Scalia; dissent by Justice Ginsburg); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist; dissent by Justice Breyer).
245 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 5.
246 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
247 Id.; Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 32.
248 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 21.
249 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Justice Souter , joined by Justice Breyer, dissented on completely
different grounds. O’Connor’s disagreement with the majority was over the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause; Souter’s was over the scope of congressional authority to enact prophylactic 
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known oral dissents Justice O’Connor issued in her more than twenty years on the
Court, she was joined only by Justice Breyer.  Justice White likewise issued two of
his five known oral dissents in cases in which only one other Justice joined him,251
and, in one of Justice Stevens’s most recent oral dissents, he was alone.252
In contrast to these examples of Justices defiantly staking out unpopular positions,
the Justices sometimes appear to be coordinating their efforts.  On June 23, 1999,
for example, the Court handed down three cases holding that Congress exceeded its
authority when it authorized lawsuits against the states in the Fair Labor Standards
Act,253 the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act,254 and a patent statute.255  The three
5-4 cases were part of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution: its controversial
effort to cut back on congressional power.  The three cases handed down in June of
1999 provided the dissenters an opportunity to shine a light on this trend, and the
primary dissenter in each case (Justices Souter, Breyer, and Stevens, respectively)
announced his opinion from the bench.256  Similarly, on June 28, 2000, the Court
announced both its decision striking down the Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban257
and its decision upholding a Colorado law restricting abortion protesters’ activities
near clinics.258  This time it was three conservative Justices—Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy—who dissented from the bench.259  They used the opportunity to collec-
tively attack the Court’s abortion jurisprudence—even in Hill v. Colorado, which
was ostensibly a First Amendment case.260
The subject matter of the cases in which there are oral dissents also varies. 
Consistent with the opinions just discussed, Blake and Hacker identify abortion and
federalism as subject areas that are particularly likely to generate oral dissents.261  But
there are numerous other subjects that have been the subject of oral dissents.  For
legislation under Section Five of the 14th Amendment. Justice Souter did not issue an oral
dissent.
251 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
252 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
253 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
254 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
255 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
256 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 32.
257 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
258 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
259 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 33.
260 Justice Thomas read his dissent in Stenberg, while Justices Scalia and Kennedy orally
dissented in Hill. Id. at 32–33, nn.181–83. Stenberg was a 5-4 decision, with Justice O’Connor
joining the four liberal Justices in the majority. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 918. Hill, however, was
6-3, with Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority (along with Justice O’Connor). Hill, 530 U.S.
at 705. Hill, then, may also fit Blake and Hacker’s profile of the case in which the dissenters
are particularly frustrated with what they may perceive as the defection of an ally.
261 Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 8.
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example, although Justice Ginsburg’s most recent (and famous) oral dissents are in
cases involving discrimination law and abortion rights,262 she has also recently dis-
sented orally in cases involving appellate jurisdiction263 and access to attorneys’ fees.264 
And of course, there are contentious and high-profile cases that do not result in oral
dissents.  The Michigan affirmative action cases,265 for example, generated enormous
controversy and attention, but the dissenters remained silent at the opinion hand-
downs.  Even some federalism and abortion cases do not result in oral dissents.266
2. The Underreporting of Oral Dissents
As described above, the evidence from the Stone, Vinson, and Warren years
suggests that oral dissents were not always reported by the media.  Nevertheless, in
the modern era, commentators and observers generally assume that oral dissents are
consistently reported by the press.267  As one recent article notes:
The Supreme Court press corps has intimate familiarity with the
Court, its procedures, and sometimes even the justices as indi-
viduals.  A dissent from the bench, widely understood in Court
circles as the preeminent “official” method of voicing disapproval,
is an immediately recognizable signal to these reporters that a
justice believes the majority opinion is of unusual significance. 
Thus, newspaper articles covering a Supreme Court decision in-
volving a dissent from the bench will typically mention that the
practice is reserved for special cases and will also attempt to con-
vey the drama of the moment when an oral dissent is delivered.268
The assumption is that the specialized knowledge of the press corps translates into con-
sistent reporting to the general public of—at the very least—the fact and significance
262 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (Title VII); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Title VII); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)
(abortion rights); see Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 36–37.
263 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
264 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001); see Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, 33–34.
265 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
266 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (federalism); Schenck
v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (abortion).
267 See, e.g., Blake & Hacker, supra note 19, at 2 (“Journalists who cover the Court
characterize a dissent being read from the bench as a statement of profound disagreement by
a dissenting justice, which makes the impact of this rare phenomenon substantial.” (citing
Biskupic, supra note 238; Greenhouse, Ginsburg, supra note 5)).
268 Bleich et al., supra note 18, at 33.
116 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:75
of most if not all oral dissents.269  Moreover, reporting of oral dissents is assumed to
regularly go beyond a passing 0mention that a Justice read a dissent from the bench
and to instead describe the content, drama, or emotion of the moment.
Such coverage, however, turns out to be surprisingly inconsistent.  Recent and
contemporary media reports of oral dissents are unpredictable, parsimonious, fre-
quently superficial, and perhaps most surprisingly, sometimes nonexistent.  This aspect
of oral dissents came as a surprise to us.  Like other observers, we had assumed that
oral dissents are always noted and discussed by the Supreme Court press corps.  But
the data show otherwise.
a. Quantitative Analysis
We began by gathering information about the news coverage of Supreme Court
cases with oral dissents.  Using electronic databases like Lexis-Nexis, Westlaw, and
America’s Newspapers, we conducted a series of searches for press coverage of oral
dissents in mainstream media outlets.  Specifically, we attempted to find the immedi-
ate press coverage for the 111 cases identified as having oral dissents between October
Term 1969 and October Term 2008.  We focused in particular on the immediate report-
ing of the cases in major daily newspapers and by the Associated Press.  The papers
we searched were the Boston Globe, Washington Post, New York Times, USA Today,
Chicago Tribune, L.A. Times, and Wall Street Journal.  Because the databases we
relied on had different dates of coverage for different news outlets, we were not able
to search for the same number of cases in every news source.  Table II sets forth the
specific media resources we searched, the databases relied on, and the dates of
coverage available.
269 See, e.g., Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 30 (“Justices who deliver dissents from
the bench know that the press is present and that their words will carry beyond the room.”);
Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 1562 (“As he gave this dissent from the bench Blackmun
certainly appears to have been cognizant that his words would have a clear effect on the
public’s view of Webster.”); Bleich et al., supra note 18, at 33 (“[A] dissent from the bench
allows a justice to communicate to the public the gravity of the Court’s decision and the depth
of his or her disagreement with it.”); id. at 34 (“A dissent from the bench can also call attention
to an important decision that might otherwise have flown under the radar and can likewise
serve as the catalyst for changing the law.”).
The Justices themselves also seem to accept this assumption. See, e.g., Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, The 20th Annual Leo and Berry Eizenstat Mem’l Lecture: The Role of Dissenting
Opinions (Oct. 21, 2001), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/
sp_10-21-07.html (“A dissent presented orally . . . garners immediate attention.”).
This assumption is also implicit in Blake and Hacker’s effort to build a dataset of oral
dissents by relying on press reports. In fairness to Blake and Hacker, at the time of their study,
there was no comprehensive list of oral dissents, and their list was superior to what existed
before it. But their article contains no discussion of the possibility that their dataset is skewed
in some way by its reliance on press reports.
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TABLE II: DATES OF COVERAGE
Press
Resource
Electronic
Database(s)
Date
Database
Coverage
Begins
Total Cases
With
Confirmed
Oral
Dissents
Announced
During
Dates
Covered
Total
Cases for
Which
Press
Coverage
Was
Identified
Associated
Press
Westlaw 1/1/1984 69 64
Boston Globe
America’s Newspapers
LexisNexis
12/12/1979
9/1/1988
76
64
55
Chicago
Tribune
America’s Newspapers
LexisNexis
1/1/1985 67 58
Los Angeles
Times
LexisNexis 1/1/1985 67 60
New York
Times
LexisNexis
Westlaw
6/1/1980 76 74
USA Today America’s Newspapers 1/1/1985 67 51
Wall Street
Journal
LexisNexis 1/1/1984 71 54
Washington
Post
America’s Newspapers
LexisNexis
1/1/1977 88 76
Note: Where two databases are noted, we used both to search for press coverage. 
We did not separately track which databases contained articles about which cases. 
Although there were some cases for which we were unable to find articles in particular
news sources, we do not assume that such press coverage was necessarily absent.
For each of these news sources, we searched for coverage of each case on our
list decided within the timeframe covered by the relevant databases.  We focused on
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straight news articles appearing within a day or two of the decision.270  If we identified
such coverage, we noted whether the coverage included mention of the fact that an
oral dissent was delivered.  The results are reported in Table III.
TABLE III: REPORTING OF ORAL DISSENTS IN MAINSTREAM NEWSPAPERS
Press Source
Total Cases
With
Identified
Press
Coverage
Cases With
Press Coverage
Not Mentioning
Oral Dissent
Cases With
Press Coverage
Mentioning
Oral Dissent
Associated Press 64 40 (62.5%) 24 (37.5%)
Boston Globe 55 41 (74.5%) 14 (25.5%)
Chicago Tribune 58 29 (50.0%) 29 (50.0%)
Los Angeles Times 60 23 (38.3%) 37 (61.7%)
New York Times 74 38 (51.4%) 36 (48.6%)
USA Today 51 26 (51.0%) 25 (49.0%)
Wall Street Journal 54 47 (87.0%) 7 (13.0%)
Washington Post 76 17 (22.4%) 59 (77.6%)
The most striking aspect of our findings is the pervasive underreporting of oral
dissents in a significant percentage of cases.  Some news sources, including those—
like the New York Times and the Washington Post—that we might expect to provide
the most comprehensive and consistent information about oral dissents in fact mention
them only sometimes.  Specifically, the New York Times mentions only about half of
them; the Associated Press—whose wire stories appear all over the country—mentions
them only slightly more than one third of the time.
Even the Washington Post, with the highest rate of mentioned oral dissents, omits
mention of about a quarter of them.  Moreover, some news coverage may mention
the fact of an oral dissent, along with a generic statement that Justices rarely dissent
orally and only when they have particularly strong feelings about a case but often
provides no information about the content or tenor of the particular dissent.  For
some news sources, like the Boston Globe, the frequency with which oral dissents
270 For purposes of this count, therefore, we did not include news analysis, op-eds, or
editorials.
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are reported varies with the identity of the reporter.  During the years when Lyle
Denniston—now a reporter for SCOTUSblog.com and, at more than 50 years,271 the
longest serving member of the Supreme Court press corps—covered the Supreme
Court for the Boston Globe, his articles almost always mentioned—but did not elab-
orate on—oral dissents when they were given.  When other reporters were at the helm,
however, the Globe’s coverage rarely mentioned oral dissents at all.
b. Examples
A few examples demonstrate the surprisingly inconsistent press coverage of oral
dissents.  In June of 2000, when the Court announced its decisions in Stenberg v.
Carhart,272 Justice Thomas read his dissent in Stenberg—apparently the first time he
had ever dissented from the bench.273  On the same day, Justices Scalia and Kennedy
both read their dissents in Hill v. Colorado, which upheld Colorado’s law restricting
abortion protesters.274
The news coverage of the oral dissents in these cases varied widely.  USA
Today, the L.A. Times, and the Wall Street Journal did not mention any of them.275 
The Washington Post, the only news outlet we examined that mentioned all three oral
dissents, noted only that “[t]he two decisions also provoked heated dissents, portions
271 Lyle Denniston, The Shrinking Supreme Court and Its Dwindling Press Corps, 59
SYRACUSE L. REV. 417, 425 n.24 (2009).
272 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
273 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 33. Lambert and Duffy do not report any earlier
instances of Justice Thomas orally dissenting. Due to the incompleteness of their survey of
opinion hand downs, however, such cases may yet be identified. Interestingly, Thomas him-
self seemed to forget about his Stenberg dissent. Six years later, when he dissented orally in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), he said that it was the first time he had ever done
so. See Adam Liptak, In a Polarized Court, Getting the Last Word, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2001, at A12 (noting that “Justice Thomas’s memory failed him” when he announced his
Hamdan dissent).
274 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at
32–33. Scalia’s dissent in Hill is a classic example of demosprudence. He complains explicitly
that because the Court has declared abortion constitutionally protected, those people who
oppose abortion as a matter of conscience have no way to try to stop abortions without trying
to persuade individual women not to have them. In that context, he deplored Hill’s holding
that would prevent what might be the most effective form of such persuasion.
275 Joan Biskupic, Abortion Debate Will Continue to Rage: Despite Ruling, ‘Need to Speak
Out’ Is Strong, USA TODAY, June 29, 2000, at 9A; Joan Biskupic, Court Sharply Divided:
‘Partial Birth’ Abortion Ban Struck Down; Scouts Can Reject Gay Leader, USA TODAY,
June 29, 2000, at 1A; Robert S. Greenburger, High Court Strikes Down Nebraska Abortion
Law, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2000, at A3; Patrick O’Driscoll, Ruling Upholding ‘Bubbles’ at
Clinics Hailed, Denounced, USA TODAY, June 29, 2000, at 9A; David G. Savage, Supreme
Court Decisions: High Court Strikes Down ‘Partial-Birth’ Abortion Ban, L.A. TIMES, June 29,
2000, at A1.
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of which were read aloud in the tense court chambers by Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas.”276
In contrast, the Chicago Tribune reported that Justice Thomas “read portions of
his dissent aloud in the courtroom and spared no detail, using explicit terms to inform
spectators how D&X [dilation and extraction] abortions, a ‘horrific procedure border-
ing on infanticide,’ are performed.”277  The Boston Globe likewise noted that Justice
Thomas “deplored [the Stenberg decision] as ‘grievously wrong’ and morally indefen-
sible,” contributing to “drama inside the chamber on the last day of the high court’s
term.”278  But neither paper said anything about the equally dramatic oral dissents in
Hill.  The New York Times, on the other hand, reported that in Hill, “Justice Scalia
and Justice Kennedy read their impassioned dissenting opinions in the courtroom this
morning for more than half an hour, making clear that this First Amendment debate
was in many respects a proxy for the court’s ongoing abortion debate.”279  But the
Times said nothing whatsoever about Justice Thomas’s oral dissent in Stenberg,
despite the novelty of it being his first, the inclusion of graphic descriptions of the
abortion procedure that Nebraska wished to outlaw, and Justice Thomas’s assertion
that “many find this hard to distinguish from infanticide.”280
Even Justice Breyer’s famous line in Parents Involved—“it is not often in the law
that so few have so quickly changed so much”281—was not immediately reported by
many news outlets.  No mention was even made of the fact that he gave an oral dis-
sent, much less of his unwritten addition, in the immediate coverage by the Chicago
Tribune.282  In the Boston Globe, the initial report of the case did not mention either
the oral dissent or the famous line,283 although both were mentioned in a subsequent
276 Edward Walsh & Amy Goldstein, Supreme Court Upholds Two Key Abortion Rights,
WASH. POST, June 29, 2000, at A1.
277 Jan Crawford Greenburg, Late-Term Abortion Ban Voided, CHI. TRIB., June 29,
2000, at 1.
278 Mary Leonard, High Court Voids Nebraska Ban on Type of Abortion: Ruling Cites
Obstacle to a Woman’s Right to End Pregnancy, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2000, at A1.
279 Linda Greenhouse, Court Rules That Governments Can’t Outlaw Type of Abortion,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Type of Abortion].
280 Transcript of Opinion Announcement, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-
830) (Thomas, J., dissenting), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999
_99_830/opinion. In fact, the New York Times barely even mentioned Justice Thomas’s written
dissent. Greenhouse, Type of Abortion, supra note 279.
281 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
282 Naftali Bendavid, High Court Strikes Down School Integration Plans, CHI. TRIB.,
June 29, 2007, at 1. The Bendavid article was an analysis and reaction piece. The Tribune also
ran a short summary of the opinions from the New York Times News Service. That summary,
at least as it appeared in the Tribune, also contained no mention of the oral dissent. School
Decision Divides Justices, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2007, at 26.
283 Charlie Savage, Justices, in Shift, Reject 2 Race-Based School Plans, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 29, 2007, at 1A.
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summary article about the Court’s shift to the right.284  Even Charles Ogletree, in an
op-ed piece that ran in the Globe the day after Parents Involved was decided, did not
mention Breyer’s oral dissent285—despite being one of the three civil rights lawyers
whom Guinier says Breyer looked at directly during his bench statement.286  In both
USA Today and the Washington Post, the principal report of the case mentioned that
Breyer dissented orally, but did not quote his scathing remark.287  Indeed, in the
initial coverage of the case, the New York Times was the only paper we have found
that quoted his “most pointed words” and noted that they “appeared nowhere in his
77-page opinion.”288
We do not mean to suggest that news outlets should always report on oral dissents
or should do so in detail.  Space is limited; Supreme Court decisions must compete
with other news for column inches.  When many cases are announced at once, they
must even compete with each other.289  Frequently, the reporter must choose between
a variety of possible emphases in writing the article.  In the 2000 abortion cases, for
example, Linda Greenhouse for the New York Times emphasized Justice Kennedy’s
surprising role.290  As one of the Justices who authored the famous opinion refusing
to overrule Roe in Casey,291 his willingness to uphold an abortion restriction was par-
ticularly notable.  Other reporters emphasized the upcoming presidential election and
the significance of a 5-4 abortion ruling in light of the likelihood that the next presi-
dent would be able to appoint at least one Justice.292  The appropriate emphasis is often
a judgment call, and choosing one emphasis often precludes another.
Interestingly, the print reporters who are most famously associated with their cover-
age of the Supreme Court—Linda Greenhouse for the New York Times, Joan Biskupic
for the Washington Post and more recently for USA Today, and Lyle Denniston, who
has reported for a range of publications293—may be more likely to note the existence
of an oral dissent than other less established reporters.  Yet there is a surprising in-
congruity.  These reporters’ coverage of the oral dissent is likely to be either without
284 Charlie Savage, High Court Remains Politically Divided: More 5-4 Rulings Mark Shift
to Right, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2007, at 1A.
285 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Op-Ed, Brown’s Legacy Lives, but Barely, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 29, 2007, at 17A.
286 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 7 n.1, 10 n.21.
287 Robert Barnes, Divided Court Limits Use of Race by School Districts, WASH. POST,
June 29, 2007, at A1; Joan Biskupic, School Diversity Programs in Doubt: Ruling Limits Use
of Race as Factor, USA TODAY, June 29, 2007, at 1A. In USA Today, the famous line did
appear in an analysis of the entire Term that appeared the same day. Joan Biskupic, Roberts
Steers Court Right Back to Reagan, USA TODAY, June 29, 2007, at 8A.
288 Greenhouse, Integration Plans, supra note 18.
289 Denniston, supra note 271, at 423.
290 Greenhouse, Type of Abortion, supra note 279.
291 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992).
292 See Leonard, supra note 278; Savage, supra note 275; Walsh & Goldstein, supra note 276.
293 Denniston, supra note 271, at 425 n.24.
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substance—a mere passing mention—or focused primarily on the drama of the pre-
sentation, not on the content.  Thus, the most knowledgeable and expert reporters do
little to highlight the uniquely accessible aspects of oral dissents.  They instead seem
more interested in the inside baseball—what the emotional tenor of an oral dissent
tells us about the personalities and relationships of the Justices.  This interest may arise
from the nature of their work.  They spend hours reading briefs and opinions and have
little or no actual contact with the people they cover.  So when they do catch a glimpse
of a Justice’s emotional side, that may stand out for them as particularly unusual and
interesting.  But while this kind of coverage is unquestionably fascinating to the court
watcher, the lawyer, and the informed elite reader, it may ill serve the average reader,
even the average well-informed and educated reader.  It certainly does not promote
public dialogue.294  Regardless of its effects, however, the selective coverage of the
existence and content of oral dissents thus illustrates the role of the press in identify-
ing and publicizing only those oral dissents (or aspects of them) that the reporters and
their editors deem interesting or important.
3. Sparking Public Dialogue or Blowing Off Steam?
In light of the media’s inconsistent treatment of oral dissents, important questions
arise about the Justices’ own desire and expectation that oral dissents will foster pub-
lic, even democracy-enhancing dialogue.  As an institution, the Court appears deeply
ambivalent about its relationship with the public, and, the conduct of the Court itself—
or at least of some of the Justices—suggests a rejection of Guinier’s vision of a demo-
cratic dialogue between the Court and the people.
Specifically, an examination of the Justices’ actions and attitudes suggests ambiv-
alence—or at least some disagreement—about whether oral dissents are public
events that the Justices expect or hope will be covered in the press and therefore will
have some public impact.  Some Justices have deliberately used the bench as a
platform for speaking publicly.  As already noted, Justice Stewart regularly dissented
from the bench due to his “firm conviction that the republic deserves an explanation
of where its Supreme Court Justices stand on an issue—and why . . . .”295  When
Justice Ginsburg dissents from the bench, for example, she circulates a written copy
of her oral remarks to the press.296  And on one occasion, Stevens dissented orally in
part due to his concern “that what the court had done might get lost in the rush of other
‘newsworthy’ opinions handed down” that day.297
294 When reading some of the most informative coverage, such as Charlie Savage of the
Boston Globe, it is impossible to tell whether the reporter was even present for the opinion
announcement.
295 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 1567 (quoting Tribe, supra note 223, at 1331).
296 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Informing the Public about the U.S. Supreme Court’s Work,
20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 275 (1998). She does the same for bench statements announcing
majority opinions. Id.
297 Kamen, supra note 225.
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On the other hand, some Justices, like Burger, White, and Brennan, who gener-
ally eschewed oral dissents and were even inclined to give up the practice of bench
announcements of majority opinions, believed that the written opinions should stand
on their own.  For them, speaking to the public through an oral dissent (or through the
press) was simply improper.  Chief Justice Rehnquist once told a group of journalists,
“You know, the difference between us and the other branches of government is that
we don’t need you people of the press.”298  And Justice Scalia once gave a speech criti-
cizing the media’s coverage of the Supreme Court.  “[L]aw is a specialized field, fully
comprehensible only to the expert” and newspaper reporters regularly fail to accu-
rately represent the complexities of Supreme Court opinions.299
The Court’s institutional practices with respect to the press, moreover, diminish
the likelihood that a Justice’s oral dissent will have a public impact or spark a public
dialogue.  As it stands now, no one outside the Court knows when any particular
case might be decided.300  Towards the end of the Term, of course, in late June, Court
watchers know which cases (often the most controversial of the Term) are still outstand-
ing, and by the last day, everyone knows which cases are left.301  But during the rest
of the Term, opinions might be announced at any point along the way.  Many Supreme
Court opinions carry little or no widespread political implications; they are technical
regulatory or statutory cases that are often unanimous.  Yet scattered among those
cases throughout the Term are many important and controversial cases, some of which
have involved dramatic but strikingly underreported oral dissents.302  News outlets
without a full-time reporter assigned to the Court (and the number that have them are
dwindling)303 are unlikely to have a presence in the courtroom when those significant
cases are announced.  While the cases and written opinions will likely be reported in
major news outlets, those outlets will rely either on reporters who have read the
opinions but were not in the courtroom or on wire service reports.304  As a result, any
theatrics in the courtroom are likely to go unreported in most news outlets.
298 Tony Mauro, The Chief and Us: Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the News Media, and
the Need for Dialogue Between Judges and Journalists, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 407, 410 (2006).
299 JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 145 (2009) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Is Law Too Complicated for
General Media to Cover?, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 1, 1990).
300 See generally Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at
the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1558–59 (1996) [hereinafter Greenhouse, Court’s
Story] (describing the unpredictable nature of the Court’s calendars).
301 Id. at 1558.
302 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), for example, was
decided on March 21, 2000. Of the mainstream newspapers we surveyed, we found only one
(the Washington Post) that mentioned Justice Breyer’s oral dissent. Joan Biskupic, FDA Can’t
Regulate Tobacco, Supreme Court Rules 5 to 4, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2000, at A1.
303 Denniston, supra note 271, at 420–21.
304 The major wire services do have full-time reporters at the Supreme Court. Id. But the
wire service articles are likely to be subject to more ruthless cutting than are articles by staff 
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Other aspects of the Court’s practices with respect to the press also reduce the
likelihood that oral dissents will reach many in the public or even be mentioned at all. 
Especially late in the Term, when oral dissents are more likely because many of the
most contentious cases are being announced, the Court is also likely to have what the
press calls “heavy” days, when a large number of opinions are announced.305  Reporters
do not like heavy days.  If there are too many cases announced at once, especially too
many significant cases (as, again, is likely towards the end of the Term), the reporters
may not be able to give each case the space he or she thinks it deserves (or any space
at all).306  Or the reporters may be so pressed for time that they unable to do a thorough
job of explaining the reasoning and significance of each one.  Linda Greenhouse, for
example, wryly recalled one occasion on which she “ran out of time” to cover a sig-
nificant grant of certiorari due to having to cover a major abortion case decided the
same day.307  As a result, her article covered only the abortion case and the New York
Times had to run a wire service article about the other.308  The Court’s practice of
handing down many cases on a single day has been a bone of contention for its press
corps for years.309  Although the Court long ago made some adjustment to the media’s
complaints—in 1965, it agreed to no longer hand down cases only on Mondays—it
continues its practice of handing down cases as they are ready, with no apparent
regard for the effect on those who must report those cases to the public.310  As Linda
Greenhouse argues, the Court is in general “quite blithely oblivious to the needs of
those who convey its work to the outside world . . . .”311
The Court’s longstanding failure to respond to many of the press’s concerns sug-
gests that the Court has little interest in promoting coverage of the Justices’ bench state-
ments.312  This reality suggests that the Justices may very well perceive the audience
for the oral dissent to be a primarily internal one—their colleagues, the law clerks, the
reporters for a newspaper, id., at 422, reducing the chances of information about an oral dissent
appearing in most papers even if the wire service reporter mentioned it.
305 Greenhouse, Court’s Story, supra note 300, at 1558 (describing the last day of a term as
a “journalistic nightmare” due to the volume and significance of decisions issued that day).
306 Cf. Kamen, supra note 225.
307 Greenhouse, supra note 300, at 1550.
308 Id.
309 RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 36,
116–17 (1994); Greenhouse, Court’s Story, supra  note 300, at 1558; Mauro, supra note 298,
at 408; Stephen J. Wermiel, News Media Coverage of the United States Supreme Court, 42
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1059, 1073 (1998).
310 DAVIS, supra note 309, at 117.
311 Greenhouse, Court’s Story, supra note 300, at 1559; see also DAVIS, supra note 309,
at 36–37, 116–17; Ginsburg, supra note 296, at 281. As recently as 2006, one of the Court’s
longtime reporters complained about this practice in print. See Mauro, supra note 298, at 408;
see also Denniston, supra note 271, at 423 (writing in 2009 about a day when the New York
Times was able to cover only two of six cases decided).
312 Greenhouse, Court’s Story, supra note 300, at 1559.
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handful of knowledgeable Court watchers in the room.  This in turn implies that, for
the Justices, the purpose of the oral dissent may be largely motivated by emotional
and interpersonal factors.
4. Making History
If oral dissents are not deemed newsworthy simply by virtue of their existence,
and if the Court as an institution fails to promote oral dissents as significant events,
how is it that some oral dissents can nonetheless capture considerable attention?  For
the most recent high-profile oral dissents that have become publicly significant, as for
the older ones, observers and commentators have identified and promoted narratives
into which the dissents fit.  Consider, for example, Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent in
Ledbetter.313  Justice Ginsburg’s explicit hope in both her oral and written opinions
that Congress would override the Court’s decision314 was realized when President
Obama signed into law The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.315
Any causal connection between Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent and this legislative
action is far from clear, however, despite claims and inferences to the contrary.316  The
quick congressional action and the fame of the oral dissent may both be a result of for-
tuitous timing.  Ledbetter was decided in the spring of 2007, as the 2008 presidential
campaign was beginning.  In that campaign, the case and its sympathetic plaintiff be-
came a cause around which many rallied—including presidential candidates Barack
Obama and Hillary Clinton.317  Ledbetter herself spoke at the Democratic National
Convention in 2008.  Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent fit well into the story that was
playing out, and it was therefore natural for her dissent to become part of the larger
story.  But it seems likely that the same things would have happened even if Justice
Ginsburg had not read her dissent from the bench; the oral dissent cannot be said to
have caused the events that followed it.
Likewise, in Parents Involved,318 a few members of the press and legal com-
mentators elevated Breyer’s oral dissent into a central story of the decision.  Some
accounts made note of the unusual length of time Breyer held the stage in reading
313 Transcript of Opinion Announcement, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1074/opinion.
314 Id.
315 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
316 See, e.g., Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 22, at 542 (“Democrats in Congress
responded quickly” to Ginsburg’s oral dissent); Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Gives No Hint of
Giving Up the Bench, WASH. POST, April 12, 2009, at A1; Liptak, supra note 13.
317 Editorial Board, The Democrats’ Secret Weapon: Lilly Ledbetter, N.Y. TIMES, CAMPAIGN
STOPS (Aug. 28, 2008 7:12 PM) http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/the
-democrats-secret-weapon-lilly-ledbetter/.
318 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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his dissent—over twenty minutes.319  Most emphasized—often in quite dramatic
terms—the unusual emotion the typically reserved Justice displayed.  Writing in the
Washington Post, Dahlia Lithwick characterized Breyer’s oral dissent as a “lash[ing]
out” at the majority and labeled his most quoted line—“It is not often in the law that
so few have so quickly changed so much”—as an “outburst.”320  Reporting for CNN
directly following the announcement of the opinion, Jeffrey Toobin sought to capture
the high drama of the scene:
Boy, . . . 15 minutes ago the Supreme Court was at war with itself
in a drama that is rarely seen inside that room.  You had two jus-
tices basically shouting out, not literally, but talking about the
very premises of what it means to be an American.  That was what
was at stake in the court today.  And the drama and the anger and
the passion was something that’s rarely seen in that courtroom.321
In response to Breyer’s claim about the alarming nature of the majority’s redirection
of desegregation law, in Toobin’s words, “both Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts
looked over at Breyer and went, whoa, that’s pretty personal by the standards of the
Supreme Court.”322
Yet as we have already noted, much of the immediate press coverage of Parents
Involved did not mention Breyer’s statements at all.323  The process of elevating his
oral dissent—of in effect creating its significance—took some time.  In fact, in argu-
ing for the importance of Breyer’s bench statement, Guinier herself added to the fame
and drama of his remarks with her vivid description of the opinion announcement, as
seen through the eyes of “three prominent black civil rights lawyers.”324
319 See, e.g., Greenhouse, Integration Plans, supra note 18; Anthony Lewis, The Court:
How ‘So Few Have So Quickly Changed So Much,’ N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 20, 2007 (review
of TOOBIN, supra note 11).
320 Dahlia Lithwick, It Isn’t Tilting in the Same Old Ways, WASH. POST, June 15, 2008, at
B1; see also Greenhouse, Integration Plans, supra note 18; Lewis, supra note 147 (describing
Justice Breyer as “usually a cheerful optimist, win or lose”).
321 Toobin: School Ruling ‘a Victory for Conservatives,’ CNN.COM, ON THE SCENE (June 28,
2007 3:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/28/toobin.ots/.
322 Id.; see also TOOBIN, supra note 11, at 336 (“At this direct slap, Alito roused himself and
stared across the bench at Breyer. Roberts didn’t change expression, but the muscles in his jaw
twitched. Above all, Breyer was taking a stand against the agenda that was born in the Reagan
years, nurtured by the Federalist Society, championed by the right wing of the Republican
Party, and propelled by the nominations of Roberts and Alito.”).
323 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.
324 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 7. The lawyers are Professors Charles Ogletree,
John Payton, and Ted Shaw. Guinier’s recreation of the details and tone of the scene come
in part from her interviews with Professors Ogletree and Payton. See id. at 7 n.1, 10 n.21.
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Moments after Chief Justice Roberts finishes speaking, a voice
both incredulous and distressed pierces the High Court’s etiquette. 
Bristling with barely concealed anger but tempered by the circum-
spection of the law professor he once was, Justice Stephen Breyer
informs those assembled that he takes strong objection to Chief
Justice Roberts’s pronouncement of the law. . . .
On a nine-person bench where the give and take between
judges and lawyers usually involves rapid-fire exchanges, Justice
Breyer proceeds to “hold court” alone for the next twenty-one
minutes. . . .  The five Republican appointees, he suggests, are
dictating their own policy preferences in the name of the law. 
Justice Breyer denounces Chief Justice Roberts’s temerity with
sixteen memorable words: “It is not often in the law that so few
have so quickly changed so much.”325
In an interview with Guinier, Charles Ogletree, one of the civil rights lawyers who
was present in the courtroom, added that Justice Breyer “was looking right at [the
three of] us as he was reading his dissent.  This was his coming out as a dissenter.  I
felt overwhelmed by it.”326  In fact, however, Justice Breyer “came out” as a dissenter
in his very first Term on the Court, when he dissented from the bench in Lopez.327 
Since then, he has dissented from the bench eight more times, not including Parents
Involved.328  But Ogletree’s visceral response to Breyer’s Parents Involved oral dis-
sent illustrates its particular significance for the civil rights community and may help
explain the oral opinion’s fame.
Not only did Breyer’s dissent from the bench become a focal point for a larger
public debate over the role of racial classifications in American life but also as much
for the debate over direction of the Roberts Court.  In a speech soon after the decision,
Senator Charles Schumer identified Breyer’s now famous so-few-so-quickly-so-
much line as “the most pithy and poignant indictment of the new Court’s direction.”329 
One reporter described Breyer’s line as “the liberal summation of the whole [October
2006] Term.”330  All the attention to Breyer’s words even aroused some conserva-
tives to claim media bias.  One conservative commentator claimed that the rightful
sound-bite winner from Parents Involved was Chief Justice Roberts’s line, “The way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race, is to stop discriminating on the basis of
325 Id. at 8–9 (citations omitted).
326 Id. at 10 n.21.
327 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 30.
328 Duffy & Lambert, supra note 14, at 30–37.
329 Senator Charles Schumer, Speech to American Constitution Society (July 27, 2007),
available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=280107.
330 Guinier, Foreword, supra note 21, at 9 n.20 (quoting Telephone Interview with Robert
Barnes, Supreme Court Reporter, Wash. Post (July 16, 2008)).
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race”331—a line that did actually appear in his written opinion of the Court.332  Control
of the narrative can be contentious.
The numerous descriptions of Breyer’s oral statement in Parents Involved—by the
media, by scholars, and by social activists—is a recent example of how bench state-
ments can take on a life of their own as they are described and recalled in the days,
months, and years afterwards.  Certain decision announcements may even take on a
kind of legendary quality, particularly when there are significant deviations from the
written opinions, when the emotion of the scene is particularly dramatic, or when the
oral dissent illustrates a narrative already attractive to observers.  Guinier, in other
words, may be wrong about the novelty of oral dissents and she may overstate their
likely impact, but she is undoubtedly correct that these bench statements are most
likely to contribute to public dialogue when they speak to social movements or norm
entrepreneurs already poised to exploit them.  This is all the more true because of the
media’s underreporting of such dissents and the Justices’ own choice not to exercise
what little control they might have over how oral dissents are received by the public.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to use the lessons of history to provide some much needed
perspective on contemporary oral dissent practices.  These lessons include, most obvi-
ously, that recent claims of the novelty of the practice or the inherent newsworthiness
of an oral dissent are wide of the mark.  There is a long and rich history of dramatic
and emotional dissents from the bench.  Our analysis further demonstrates the critical
role that the media, academics, and activists play in creating the meaning and signifi-
cance of any particular oral dissent.  The details of what exactly was said in a bench
announcement, the tone with which it was delivered, how different people reacted
to the statements, how to understand the significance of the statement—all of this is
filtered through the perspective of the courtroom observer and then retold and re-
shaped in subsequent accounts.  It is in this practice of dissemination and retelling that
the significance of an oral dissent is established.  From this perspective, the story of
Justice Stevens’s oral dissent in Citizens United has only just begun.  Justice Stevens
stepped down at the end of the Term in which he issued that dissent.  Perhaps, then,
the sense of his oral dissent as the “twilight” of the “Stevens era”333 will solidify.  And
if activists and politicians unhappy with the Court’s opinion succeed in passing new
legislation or even in amending the Constitution, Justice Stevens’s remarks may come
to be seen as having instigated a movement for legal change.  Future scholarship on
oral dissents would benefit from a shift in focus from the internal decisionmaking of
the Justices to the critical role of external actors and events in establishing the public
meaning of an oral dissent.
331 Kristen Fyfe, NBC Quotes Breyer Not Roberts in Supreme Court Ruling on Race,
NEWSBUSTERS.ORG (June 29, 2007 4:02 PM), http://newsbusters.org/node/13837.
332 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
333 Liptak, Stevens Era, supra note 2.
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At the same time, should the Justices decide that they are genuinely interested in
using bench announcements to spark or contribute to public dialogue, there are cer-
tain institutional reforms that would help.  They could seriously consider, for example,
same-day release of audio (or, even, video) of these events.  There would, undoubtedly,
be changes in the public meaning of oral dissents (and majority opinion announce-
ments) should the Court decide to do so.  If the fact and content of oral dissents were
more widely available, the interpretive process would, at a minimum, involve more
participants and different types of participants than it currently does.  More people
would hear about, listen to, and comment on oral dissents.  In addition, the interpretive
process itself might carry less significance than it currently does, and it might become
less likely that the understanding of any particular oral dissent would coalesce around
a particular story line—as it did in Parents Involved334 or the Gold Clause Case.335 
Instead, the Justices’ spoken words would likely become part of the irrepressible and
often irreverent political dialogue on the internet and on television.  In other words, the
significance of any particular oral dissent might still depend on whether it fits into a
broader public narrative, but the potential authors of this story would no longer be con-
fined to a handful of Supreme Court reporters, commentators, academics, and activists.
The effects of such changes on public attitudes toward the Court, or toward par-
ticular decisions, is difficult to predict.  Nonetheless, the Court, however reluctantly,
inevitably participates in many of our most divisive public debates.  It might well
benefit the nation for the Justices to recognize this fact, and to consider way in which
their contributions could be more effectively heard.
334 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
335 294 U.S. 330 (1935).

